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INTRODUCTION
Over the past 200 years, United States judges have developed a
series of rules and practices that minimize the role of international
law in domestic litigation. Considered collectively, these rules and
practices embody a thoroughgoing, deeply rooted provincialism-an
institutional, almost reflexive, animosity toward the application of in-
ternational law in U.S. courts. As a consequence, international law
plays almost no part in the judicial business of the United States. It is
rarely discussed in American cases, and almost never provides the rule
of decision upon which court judgments turn.
The provincialism of U.S. courts is in many ways puzzling. First, it
is hard to square with official doctrine. The Constitution, for exam-
ple, makes treaties the supreme law of the land,' and the Supreme
Court has repeatedly asserted that "international law is part of our
law."2 Second, it is hard to reconcile with the role ofjudges, who are
institutionally committed to the rule of law. Because international law
is law (a position debatable in some quarters but not in the court-
house),3 judges might be expected to lead the fight to apply it.4 In-
stead, they appear to have led the retreat. Third, the provincialism of
U.S. courts seems, on its face, bizarrely at odds with contemporary
conditions. It is a cliche, but no less true for that reason, that Ameri-
1 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
2 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), quoted in First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 452-53 (1964); Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72-73
(1941); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
3 Judges seldom question the legal character of international law, but philosophers
sometimes take a different view. See infra notes 171-86 and accompanying text (discussing
positivism and international law). Without doubting its legal character, diplomats and
political scientists often doubt international law's usefulness or practical relevance. See,
e.g, DEAN ACIHESON, FRAGMENTS OF My FLEECE 156 (1971); GEORGE F. 1 ENNAN, AMERICAN
DwLomAcy 1900-1950, at 95-101 (1951); HANs J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS
279-314 (5th ed., rev. 1978); Dean Acheson, The Arrogance of International Lawyers, 2 INT'L
LAw. 591, 592 (1968); Ian Brownlie, The Reality and Efficacy of International Law, 52 BRrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1981).
4 See, e.g., Edward D. Re, Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights, 27 AKRON
L. REv. 281, 300 (1994) (urging that effective enforcement of universally accepted legal
norms ought to be the concern of both lawyers and judges).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
can judges and lawyers are increasingly confronted with cases involv-
ing persons, property, or events outside the United States!5-just the
sorts of cases in which international law might be relevant. At the
same time, the scope and detail of international law has expanded
dramatically, 6 making it ever more likely that international law does in
fact have something to say about the situations lawyers and judges in-
creasingly confront.
In the face of its puzzling development and growing anachronism
how can the provincialism of U.S. courts be understood or defended?
The answer is important, and not just for courts. Judicial provincial-
ism inevitably migrates from the bench to the bar, and ultimately to
the citizens and residents of the United States. Sensible litigators sim-
ply do not waste their time making arguments that are unlikely to per-
suade. Given the provincialism of U.S. courts, it is never surprising to
find international law argued at the back of a brief, if it is argued at
all.7 Because our courts apply international rules so infrequently,
those rules become largely irrelevant in document drafting and trans-
actional planning as well.
Puzzling in its development and profound in its implications, ju-
dicial provincialism warrants the kind of systematic study that it sel-
dom receives.8 During law school and later practice, one is likely to
5 See, e.g., S. Tamer Cavusgil, Globalization of Markets and Its Impact on Domestic Institu-
twons, 1 IND.J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 83, 99 (Fall 1993); Harold H. Koh, Transnational Public
Law Litigation, 100 YALE LJ. 2347. 2365-66 (1991);Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the
Age of International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS LJ. 185, 188 (1993); Recommendation & Re-
port, 1993 A.BA SEC. INT'L L. & PRAc. 2-3.
6 See, e.g., BENEDETrO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
LEGAL SYSTEMS 3-5 (Rene Provost trans., 1993); Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW at
xxviii-xxix (3d ed. 1993); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 39-43 (2d ed. 1986);
ABRAM CHAYES ET AL, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS at ix-x (1968).
7 See FRANCIS A. BOYLE, DEFENDING CIVIL RESIsrANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 14-
15 (1987) ("Invariably it is the case that the international law arguments are at the very
bottom of the list of grounds upon which [criminal defense attorneys] intend to defend
their clients. In order of priority, attorneys usually strongly prefer any type of argument
based on the United States Constitution ... ; then traditional substantive and procedural
criminal law defenses; and finally, principles of international law.").
8 Several scholars have examined the individual doctrines that tend to marginalize
international law. See, e.g., Michael J. Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA.
L. REV. 325 (1986); MichaelJ. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine 83
AM. J. INT'L L 814 (1989); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760
(1988). Less frequently, scholars have taken a broader perspective, examining clusters of
such doctrines. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POuTICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICML ANSWERS:
DoEs THE RULE OF LAw APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAiRs? (1992) [hereinafter FRANCK, POLITICAL
QUESTIONS] (examining the political question doctrine, the act of state doctrine, and for-
eign sovereign immunity); JORDAN J. PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAw AS LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES (forthcoming 1996) (examining series of issues concerning international law's
treatment in all three branches of government). Still other scholars have examined the
role of particular kinds of international law in U.S. courts, or the receptivity of U.S. courts
to particular classes of international cases. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, International Law in Amer-
ican Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE LJ. 2277 (1991) (arguing that certain types of
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meet some rules and doctrines that help to minimize the role of inter-
national law in U.S. courts: standing requirements, the political ques-
tion doctrine, the rule that treaties may not be invoked in U.S. courts
unless they are self-executing, and perhaps others.9 But these rules
and doctrines tend to be examined individually, and not always with
particular reference to their effect on international law. They are typi-
cally scattered among several different courses in the legal curricu-
lum-constitutional law, conflicts of law, civil procedure, and public
international law, among others-and are thus studied in scattered
ways by both students and scholars. For practicing lawyers, the rules
and doctrines ofjudicial provincialism arise haphazardly-whenever a
situation or lawsuit makes them relevant. Random confrontations and
compartmentalized treatment hide the larger picture, a picture from
which we can learn a great deal.
This Article begins by painting the larger picture. Part I collects
all the rules and practices that conspire to minimize the role of inter-
national law in U.S. courts. The very size of the collection suggests the
depth and breadth ofjudicial animosity toward international law and
helps to dispel the impression, created by the Constitution and by
some Supreme Court opinions, that international law plays a serious,
effective role in domestic judicial practice. In addition, Part I groups
the relevant rules and practices by type. It identifies three different
ways in which U.S. courts marginalize international law: (1) by refus-
ing to hear international cases; (2) by refusing to apply international
rules in the cases they do hear; and (3) by treating both international
cases and international law as if they were domestic.
Part II examines four Supreme Court cases decided within the
past four years. The cases illustrate the deeply provincial character of
American judging, and reveal, in a concrete way, how provincialism
manifests itself in judicial decisions. Part III reviews the consequences
of provincialism-its harms to litigants, our courts, and the United
States as a whole-and suggests why those consequences cannot be
ignored. Part IV seeks to explain why provincialism survives despite its
international cases are and ought to be heard in U.S. courts); Jordan J. Paust, Customary
International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MIcH.J. INT'L L.
59 (1990) (surveyingjudicial references to and uses of customary international law in U.S.
courts); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist Vew of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L.
REv. 665 (1986) [hereinafter Trimble, Revisionist View] (arguing that customary interna-
tional law appropriately plays a more modest role than do treaties in domestic judicial
practice).
The purpose of this Article, however, is to survey all of the rules and practices that
tend to marginalize international law, whatever the source of that law (treaties, custom, or
other sources) and whatever its substantive content. Such a project necessarily sacrifices
the subtlety of narrower studies, but illuminates connections and recurring themes that
narrower studies cannot.
9 See infra part I for the effect these and other rules have on international cases.
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harms. The different forms of provincialism are founded on different
sets of supporting grounds, ranging from constitutional concerns to
ignorance. None, Part IV argues, is strong enough to justify U.S.
courts' current maltreatment of international law.
Reform is needed. Because judge-made law forms the primary
basis for provincialism, judges are in the best position to do some-
thing about it.I° The Article therefore concludes, in Part V, by urging
the adoption of judicial education programs in international law.
Judges will likely desire change once they see the issues and under-
stand the stakes involved.
I
THE THREE FACES OF PROVINCIALISM
Despite their number and disparate origins, the elements ofjudi-
cial provincialism fall into three main patterns or types: those that
keep international cases from being heard at all; those that prevent
international law from providing the rule of decision in cases that are
heard; and those that hinder the proper handling of international is-
sues and materials.
A. Jurisdictional Provincialism
'Jurisdictional provincialism" refers to the judiciary's use of rules
that marginalize international law by providing grounds upon which a
court may decline to hear a case with international ramifications.
These doctrines address questions of 'jurisdiction" or 'justiciability,"
that is, the propriety of a court deciding a case at all. Doctrines of this
type include:
(1) personal jurisdiction requirements;"
10 See Edward D. Re et al., Judicial Education on International Law Committee of the Section
of International Law of the American Bar Association: Final Report, 24 INr'L LAW. 903, 903-04
(1990) (noting that international legal issues presented to courts are often not identified
or considered adequately; calling for efforts to enhance the capacity of courts to recognize
and address such issues). There are, of course, limits to judge-made reform. Other organs
of the U.S. government equal or surpass the judiciary in their bias against international
law, and the work of those organs constrains the options available to courts. To take the
most obvious example, the U.S. Senate is often reluctant to give its advice and consent to
the ratification of treaties the United States has previously signed, and U.S. courts cannot
apply unratified treaties, regardless of their commitment to international law.
11 See FED. R. CIv. P. 4 (covering federal service of process and personal jurisdiction
requirements); 4A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCE-
DURE §§ 1133-1136 (2d ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing complexities and difficulties of
obtaining service of process over foreign litigants in federal courts). See generally Gary B.
Born & Andrew N. Vollmer, The Effect of the Revised Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on Personal
Jurisdiction, Service, and Discovery in International Cases, 150 F.R.D. 221 (1993) (discussing
1993 amendments); Gary B. Born, Reflections on Juridical Jurisdiction in International Cases, 17
GA.J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 1 (1987).
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(2) subject-matter jurisdiction requirements;' 2
(3) foreign sovereign immunity;' 3
(4) standing requirements; 14
(5) the political question doctrine; 15
(6) forum non conveniens doctrine; 16
(7) lis alibi pendens doctrine; 17 and
(8) the act of state doctrine.' 8
12 Federal courts obtain jurisdiction over many international cases pursuant to the
"alienage" provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2) (1988) (establishing federal jurisdiction
over controversies between "citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state").
Jurisdiction in these cases is defeated if foreign nationals appear on both sides of the dis-
pute. See cases cited infra note 20.
13 With important exceptions, foreign states and certain related entities are immune
from suit in U.S. courts. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
'1332, 1391, 1441, 1602-1611 (1988). Before the passage of that Act, judicial decisions
often provided immunity. See, e.g., National City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348
U.S. 356, 358 (1955) ("Very early in our history this immunity was recognized and it has
since become part of the fabric of our law.") (citations omitted); The Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) ("One of these [restrictions on the juris-
diction of a nation within its own territory] is admitted to be the exemption of the person
of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a foreign territory.").
14 Because international law is primarily thought to concern relations between states,
non-state parties to litigation may not be able to invoke that law in their claims for relief.
See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 59-60 (4th ed. 1990) (discuss-
ing primacy of states as subjects of international law); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D.
BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 64 (6th ed. 1976) (arguing that under classic
conception of international law, an individual's ability to benefit from international rules
depends on his or her link with a state, which is alone competent to assert rights against
other states); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 70-
71 [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] ("Although individuals... have some independent status as
persons in international law, the principal relationships between individuals and interna-
tional law still run through the state, and their place in international life depends largely
on their status as nationals of states.").
15 See FRANCE, POLrIcAL QUESnONs, supra note 8, at 10-20; Louis HEtuKrN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTrrUTION 208-16 (1972) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS];
Jonathan I. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 807-08
(1989); Linda Champlin & Alan Schwarz, Political Question Doctrine and Allocation of Foreign
Affairs Power, 13 HorsTRA L. REv. 215, 230-31 (1985); Glennon, supra note 8, at 814-16;
Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question"Doctrine?, 85 YALE LJ. 597 (1976).
16 See, e.g., Sheila L Birnbaum & Douglas W. Dunham, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non
Conveniens, 16 BROOK J. INT'L L. 241 (1990); Gordon W. Paulsen & Robert S. Burrick,
Forum Non Conveniens in Admiralty, 13J. MAR. L. & COM. 343 (1982).
17 See GARY B. BoRN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CiviL LITIGATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS 320-21 (2d ed. 1994).
18 See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAw AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 152-53 (4th ed. 1981) ("International law is said to require each state to
respect the validity of the public acts of other states, in the sense that its courts will not pass
judgment on the legality or the constitutionality of the acts of a foreign sovereign under his
own laws."); REBECCA M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 48-49 (1986) ("The act of state
doctrine precludes the Court from inquiring into the validity of the public acts of a recog-
nized foreign sovereign power within its own territory.... The essence of the act of state
doctrine is that the act of one independent government cannot be successfully questioned
by the courts of another.").
1995]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Courts have used all of these doctrines to decline hearing cases
with international content. International cases often involve foreign
defendants who are considered beyond the personal jurisdiction of
our courts because of their location outside the United States or gen-
eral lack of contact with the United States.19 Even if all the parties are
subject to personal jurisdiction, federal courts, especially, may find
themselves lacking subject-matter jurisdiction, frequently because for-
eign nationals appear on both sides of the dispute.20 Jurisdiction is
also blocked, with certain exceptions, when the defendant is a foreign
state or a related entity.2'
Assuming jurisdiction is established, a court may nonetheless re-
fuse to hear an international case because the plaintiff lacks standing
to assert a claim based on international law,22 the claim raises a polit-
ical question more appropriately addressed by the executive or legisla-
tive branches, 23 the forum is determined to be inconvenient,24 similar
19 E.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418-19 (1984);
Pizarro v. Hoteles Concorde Int'l, 907 F.2d 1256, 1257 (1st Cir. 1990); Guardian Royal
Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); Gian-
nouleas v. Phoenix Mar. Agencies, 525 So. 2d 1067, 1071 (La. Ct. App.), rev', 525 So. 2d
1043 (La. 1988).
20 E.g., Lloyds Bank PLC v. Norkin, 817 F. Supp. 414, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Arai v.
Tachibana, 778 F. Supp. 1535, 1543 (D. Haw. 1991); Hercules Inc. v. Dynamic Export
Corp., 71 F.R.D. 101, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
21 E.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471, 1473 (1993); Drexel Burnham Lam-
bert Group v. Galadari, 12 F.3d 317, 330-31 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1644
(1994); Antares Aircraft, L.P. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 999 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denieA 114 S. Ct. 878 (1994).
22 E.g., United States v. Sainsbury-Suarez, 797 F.2d 931, 933 (1 1th Cir. 1986) (ruling
that crew of foreign vessel detained by U.S. officials for suspected drug smuggling lacked
standing to complain of international law violation); Dickens v. Lewis, 750 F.2d 1251, 1254
(5th Cir. 1984) (ruling that individuals lacked standing to raise claims under United Na-
tions Charter); United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
("[I]ndividuals lack standing to assert violations of [non-self-executing] international trea-
ties in the absence of a protest from the offended government."). See also SEC v. Briggs,
234 F. Supp. 618, 620-21 (N.D. Ohio 1964) (doubting whether U.S. citizen had standing to
object to process served on her in Canada on the ground that the service violated Cana-
dian sovereignty).
23 E.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992) (suggesting that
question of U.S. violations of "general international law principles" is a matter for the
executive branch); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634 (1818) (stating
that questions of foreign policy belong to executive branch); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963
F.2d 332, 337 (11th Cir. 1992) (determining civil action against Nicaraguan anti-govern-
ment organizations and leaders presented nonjusticiable political question); Greenham
Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332, 1340 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating
that action by non-Congressional litigants raised nonjusticiable political questions), aft'd,
755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985); Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 903 (D.D.C. 1982) (de-
ciding that action by members of Congress against President and Secretaries of Defense
and State nonjusticiable), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied 467 U.S. 1251
(1984); United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 515, 517-18 (D. Mass. 1968) (determining that
defendant's argument that United States involvement in Vietnam violated international
law involves a nonjusticiable political question).
24 E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 259-60 (1981); Ahmed v. Boeing Co.,
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litigation is proceeding elsewhere, 25 or a decision would require the
court to judge the legality of another nation's acts taken within that
nation's borders.2 6
Not all of these rules and doctrines were created specifically for
the purpose of reducing the international workload of domestic
courts.2 7 Nor were all of them created by courts.28 Indeed, a few of
the doctrines, like foreign sovereign immunity and the act of state
doctrine, are animated by a deference to other nations and the re-
quirements, real or perceived, of international law. But whatever
their initial purposes and sources, and whatever their congruence
with international law, these rules and practices, taken together, re-
peatedly screen out the sorts of cases that international law is most
likely to govern.
B. Doctrinal Provincialism
"Doctrinal provincialism" refers to thejudiciary's use of rules that
restrict when international law can provide the rule of decision in a
court's judgment. If not for its long-windedness, this might better be
called "rule-of-decision provincialism." International law traditionally
arises from three major sources: treaties, custom, and general princi-
ples of law.2 9 Several rules and practices of U.S. courts limit the use of
such sources in domestic litigation. These rules and practices include:
(1) the rule that prevents litigants from invoking treaties unless
they are "self-executing";30
720 F.2d 224, 225-26 (1st Cir. 1983); Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc. v. Cargolux Airlines Int'l,
SA., 712 F.2d 11, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F.
Supp. 842, 866-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aftd, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987).
25 E.g., Saemann v. Everest & Jennings, Int'l, 343 F. Supp. 457, 461 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Robinson v. Royal Bank of Can., 462 So. 2d 101, 101-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Gillis v.
Gillis, 391 So. 2d 772, 772-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Bentil v. Bentil, 456 N.Y.S.2d 25, 25-
26 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
26 E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410-37 (1964); Oetjen v.
Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) ("To permit the validity of the acts of one
sovereign state to be reexamined and perhaps condemned by the courts of another would
very certainly 'imperil the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of
nations.'").
27 Many leading cases involving personal jurisdiction, the political question doctrine,
standing, and the forum non conveniens doctrine, for example, arose in a purely domestic
context. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) (personal
jurisdiction); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972) (standing); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 503 (1947) (forum non conveniens); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 139 (1803) (political question doctrine).
28 The Constitution and federal statutes, for example, impose federal subject-matter
jurisdiction requirements. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1988).
29 RE TATEMENT, supranote 14, § 102(1); Statute of the International Court ofJustice,
June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1055 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) [hereinafter ICJ
Statute].
30 See, e.g., Whimeyv. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster & Elam v. Neilson,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir.), cert.
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(2) the rule that congressional legislation supersedes pre-existing
treaty provisions;31
(3) the reluctance of U.S. courts to recognize the existence of
international custom; 32
(4) the rule that courts may not invoke customary law, unless, like
treaties, it is self-executing; 33
(5) the rule that congressional legislation supersedes pre-existing
customary law;34
denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 111(3); JOSEPH G.
STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 85 (10th ed. 1989) ("[T]reaties which are
not self-executing, but require legislation, are not binding upon American courts until the
necessary legislation is enacted."); WALLACE, supra note 18, at 43 ("Self-executing treaties
are automatically part of American domestic law-i.e., no complementary legislation is
required-whereas non self-executing treaties are not incorporated into domestic law until
the necessary enabling legislation has been passed.").
31 See, e.g., Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 316 (1914):
Treaties are contracts between nations, and by the Constitution are made
the law of the land. But the Constitution does not declare that the law so
established shall never be altered or repealed by Congress. Good faith to-
ward the other contracting nation might require Congress to refrain from
making any change, but if it does act, its enactment becomes the control-
ling law in this country.
(quoting lower court); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 115(1) (a) (specifying condi-
tions under which congressional acts will supersede prior treaties); 2 CHARLES C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAw: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 59 (1922)
(arguing that an act of Congress is regarded as superseding a prior treaty); GARY L. MAReS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 224 (1984) ("In the United States, the rule established by court deci-
sions since the 1880s for which has precedence between a law of Congress and a treaty, is
that the latest is given effect."); Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States,
82 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1563 n.31 (1984) ("Both the equality of statutes and treaties and the
later-in-time rule have, however, been upheld in numerous cases and seem firmly
established.").
32 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The requirement
that a rule [of customary international law] command the 'general assent of civilized na-
tions' to become binding upon them.., is a stringent one."); see also MARK W. JANIS, AN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 53 (2d ed. 1993) ("If no treaty can be found to
authoritatively regulate a matter, it is by no means certain that customary international law
will ... provide a... rule to fill the gap."); Trimble, Revisionist View, supra note 8, at 684
("American courts have rarely applied customary international law, and have almost never
applied it as a direct restraint against a government or a governmental interest").
33 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1090 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that
"rights under international common law must belong to sovereign nations, not to individu-
als" and that international common law "obviously could not be 'self-executing' in the
sense that a treaty might be."). See also Trimble, Revisionist View, supra note 8, at 693
("[c]ustomary law, like treaties, may be non-self-executing, creating law between states but
not in favor of individuals unless Congress has enacted implementing legislation."). But see
Paust, supra note 8, at 87 (stating that customary international law has been directly incor-
porable in U.S. law without any need for a special statutory base); Henkin, supra note 31, at
1561 (arguing international law is self-executing, and is applied by courts without need for
congressional action).
34 See, e.g., Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that an "inconsistent statute simply modifies or super-
sedes customary international law to the extent of the inconsistency" and that "under do-
mestic law, statutes supersede customary international law."); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664,
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(6) the rule that executive action supersedes pre-existing custom-
ary law;3 5 and
(7) the reluctance of U.S. courts to recognize the existence of an
international rule based on the "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations."36
International law cannot provide the rule of decision in a given
case unless an international rule is found to exist, and U.S. courts are
noticeably stingy in this regard. In American practice, only treaties
are reliable generators of international rules; custom and general
principles of law are virtually ignored in the law-finding process. 37
Moreover, if a court determines that a rule from the international sys-
tem exists, it often denies its application, either because the rule is not
"self-executing," or, if it is self-executing, because congressional or
presidential action has overridden it. The end result is that U.S.
courts seldom decide international cases on the basis of international
law.
666 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ("lIt has long been settled in the United States that the federal
courts are bound to recognize [treaties, statutes, and the Constitution] ... as superior to
canons of international law."), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Mat-
sushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp 1161, 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[I]nternational [custom-
ary] law must give way when it conflicts with or is superseded by a federal statute or treaty
... ."); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 115(1) (a) (specifying when congressional
acts supersede existing custom); 1 INTERNATIoNAL LAW." BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 170 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1970) ("[B]oth customary and conven-
tional international law are placed in the same position as any other part of municipal law,
they may be overridden by an Act of Congress .... ."); STARKE, supra note 30, at 84-85 ("[A]
later clear statute will prevail over earlier customary international law.").
35 See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 889 (1986) (giving effect to actions of the Attorney General despite court's acknowl-
edgement that those actions violated customary law); United States v. Buck, 690 F. Supp.
1291, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (acknowledging that a controlling act of the executive branch
may supersede customary international law); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 115
reporters' note 3 (discussing authority for the position that the President may violate cus-
tomary law); Jack M. Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict
Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA.J. INT'L L. 143, 145 (1984) (arguing
that the U.S. government has the power, via a "controlling executive act," to disregard
customary international law). Scholars differ on the ability of the executive branch to
trump customary international law. CompareJordan J. Paust The President is Bound by Inter-
national Law, 81 AM J. INT'L L. 377 (1987) (arguing that President may not lawfully violate
binding international law) with Henkin, supra note 31, at 1567-69 (arguing that President
has the power, if not the authority, to violate international law, and courts will not invali-
date such acts because of such violation).
36 No U.S. court, so far as this author can determine, has squarely found a "general
principle of law" to exist. See VON GLAHN, supra note 18, at 25 ("[M]any international
lawyers as well as statesmen harbor serious doubts as to the validity of the claim that 'gen-
eral principles' represent a usable source of international law."). But cf. Howard S. Schra-
der, Note, Custom and General Pfinciples as Sources of International Law in American Federal
Courts, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 751, 770-79 (1982) (describing uses of "general principles" in
U.S. decisions).
37 See infra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
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C. Methodological Provincialism
"Methodological provincialism" refers to the judicial tendency to
handle international cases as if they were domestic cases. U.S. courts
tend to use domestic patterns of analysis in identifying the relevant
issues in a case and in addressing and defending the resolution of
those issues. This type of provincialism, unlike jurisdictional and doc-
trinal provincialism, does not depend on a specific set of legal rules or
doctrines, but instead flows from an approach to rules and their analy-
sis-an approach demonstrably different from that of international
courts and tribunals.
This form of provincialism usually springs from the tacit assump-
tion that international law works on the same principles, and with the
same dynamics, as American law. It causes U.S. courts to:
(1) ignore or undervalue custom and general principles of law
(primary sources of law in the international system, but largely un-
known to our domestic one);38
(2) undervalue scholarship (which, although a secondary source
in both systems, has traditionally enjoyed a higher status in the inter-
national system) ;39
(3) overvalue judicial decisions (a primary source of law domesti-
cally, but a secondary one internationally);4o
(4) interpret treaties as if they were domestic statutes or con-
tracts;41 and
38 See ICJ Statute, supra note 29, art. 38(1) (b)-(c) (directing the International Court
of Justice to apply custom and general principles of law); RESTATEMENT, supra note 14,
§ 102(1) (a), (c) (explaining that international law is composed, inter alia, of custom and
general principles).
39 RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 103(2) (c) (when determining whether a rule has
become international law, substantial weight is accorded to the writings of scholars);
BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 24-25 ("[T]he opinions of publicists are used widely" under
the Statute of the International Court); HENrN ET AL., supra note 6, at 123 ("The place of
the writer in international law has always been more important than in municipal legal
systems."). See ICJ Statute, supra note 29, art. 38(1) (d) (teachings of the most highly quali-
fied publicists provide a subsidiary means for determining rules of law).
40 The Statute of the International Court ofJustice expressly describes judicial deci-
sions as a "subsidiary means" for determining the content of international law, nominally
on par with the work of scholars and below treaty, custom, and general principles. ICJ
Statute, supra note 29, art. 38 (1) (d). Even decisions of the ICJ itself bind only the parties,
and only with respect to the particular case decided. Id., art. 59. Although the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States reports that "substantial
weight" is accorded judicial decisions, it accords the same weight to scholarly writings. RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 14, § 103(2) (a)-(b).
41 For recent examples of this practice, see United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655, 662-63 (1992), and Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2563-67 (1993),
both discussed more fully infta, Part II. See also Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40
(1931);Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 439
(1921); Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902); United States v. Texas, 162 U.S. 1,
36-37 (1896); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1880); Coplin v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct.
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(5) support propositions of international law with domestic
citations.42
Because methodological provincialism displays itself in judicial
method and attitude, rather than in the express invocation of particu-
lar doctrines or rules, it is harder to detect than provincialism's other
forms. Nevertheless, it exists, even at the highest levels of the national
judiciary. The United States Supreme Court, in four recent cases, pro-
vides some of the clearest, sustained examples of the phenomenon.
II
PROVINCIALISM AND THE SUPREME COURT
During the last four years, the United States Supreme Court has
considered a handful of cases with obvious international ramifica-
tions. Four of those cases, each to be studied here, involved respec-
tively: (1) a U.S. government-sponsored kidnapping in Mexico; 43 (2)
a U.S. company's alleged discrimination against an American citizen
working in Saudi Arabia;44 (3) a U.S. antitrust action against British
nationals for conduct that occurred in Great Britain;45 and (4) the
U.S. government's interception of Haitian nationals on the high
seas. 46 Each case involved other nations' interests. Additionally, there
existed in each case a body of international law that directly addressed
those interests. Yet the Supreme Court almost wilfully minimized the
effect of international law. Not once did international law provide the
rule of decision. Not once did it provide the framework of analysis.
And only occasionally, in 100 pages of written opinions by four succes-
sive majorities, was it even mentioned by name. In the recent practice
of the Supreme Court, international law has dropped from sight with
hardly a trace. 47
115, 125-26 (1984), rev'd, 761 F.2d 688 (Fed. Cir. 1985), aff'd sub nom. O'Connor v. United
States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986).
42 For a recent example of this practice, see Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 662-63 (sup-
porting law of treaty interpretation and law of international extradition with domestic
citations).
43 Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655.
44 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 246 (1991).
45 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2898 (1993).
46 Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2552 (1993).
47 SeeHarryA. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104YALELJ. 39, 40
(complaining that in recent cases, including Alvarez-Machain and Sale, the Supreme Court
"has shown something less that 'a decent respect for the opinions of mankind.'"). The
prognosis for international law is not, however, entirely bleak. Each of the four cases men-
tioned above generated dissents and international law received fair treatment in at least
two of those opinions. SeeHartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2917-22 (ScaliaJ., dissenting in part); Sale,
113 S. Ct. at 2567-77 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). In addition, lower federal courts, as well as
state courts, are occasionally more sympathetic to international law than is our highest
tribunal. See, e.g., Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd
sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); United States Verdugo-
Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted andjudgment vacated, 505 U.S. 1201
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The international kidnapping case, United States v. Alvarez-
Machain,48 is particularly instructive, and forms the principal object of
study in this Part. The other three cases will be examined more
briefly, to demonstrate that the provincialism of Alvarez-Machain is not
idiosyncratic and to highlight additional features of provincialism not
fully apparent in Alvarez-Machain. Taken together, these cases not
only reveal the deeply provincial character of Supreme Court deci-
sion-making, but also illustrate how the different forms of provincial-
ism actually manifest themselves in the work of U.S. courts.
A. The Curious Case of Alvarez-Machain (and Why It Is So
Curious)
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court held that a Mexican na-
tional's forcible abduction from Mexico, at the request of U.S. govern-
ment officials, did not rob U.S. courts of jurisdiction to try him on
federal criminal charges.49 As one might expect, the decision gener-
ated a maelstrom of law review comment-most of it critical.50 Na-
tional leaders from around the world were critical as well:
Neighboring countries like Canada and most Latin American states,
long-time friends including Switzerland and Australia, and more
predictable critics, such as Cuba and Iran, [reacted negatively]. The
Chinese press, eager to discuss a human rights issue other than the
Tienanmen Massacre, joined the chorus.51
(1992); United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1990), afl'd sub nom.
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), and rev'd, 504 U.S. 655
(1992); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (international
human rights); Van Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D.D.C. 1985) (international
law regarding treatment of diplomats), vacated, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990); State v.
Miller, 755 P.2d 434, 436 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (international law of prescriptive
jurisdiction).
48 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
49 Id at 657.
50 Compare Manuel R. Angulo & James D. Reardon, Jr., The Apparent Political and Ad-
ministrative Expediency Exception Established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Humberto
Alvarez-Machan to the Rule of Law as Reflected by Recognized Principles of International Law, 16
B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 245, 245 (1993) andJonathan A. Bush, How Did We Get Here?
Foreign Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 45 STAN. L. REv. 939, 943-44 (1993) and Michael J.
Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on U.S. v. Alvarez-Machan, 86 AM.J. INT'L L.
746, 746 (1992) and John Quigley, Our Men in Guadalajara and the Abduction of Suspects
Abroad: A Comment on U.S. v. Alvarez-Machan, 68 NoRE DAME L. REv. 723, 723-24 (1993)
and HernanJ. Ruiz-Bravo, Monstrous Decision: KidnappingIs Legal, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
833, 834-35 (1993) (criticizing the decision) with Malvina Halberstam, In Defense of the
Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736. 737 (1992) (defending
the decision).
51 Bush, supra note 50, at 942 (internal citations omitted); see generally David 0. Stew-
art, The Price of Vengeance 78 A.BA J. 50 (Nov. 1992) (describing the adverse reactions of
several nations).
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The Mexican government, of course, considered the decision "invalid
and unacceptable."52
From the perspective of the international lawyer, however, the
most striking aspect of the case does not lie in the Supreme Court's
ultimate decision. The precise substantive issue decided by the Court
was narrow. The Court held that a state-sponsored abduction of an-
other state's national from its territory will not, in the absence of an
explicit treaty obligation to the contrary, rob the abducting state's
courts ofjurisdiction to try the abductee-an issue important enough
for only a sentence or two in a general treatise on international law53
and a decision at least plausibly correct.54 Of much more enduring
interest is the Court's approach to the case: its conception of the is-
sues presented and its methods of resolving them. This approach was
doggedly domestic, and confirms the meager role of international law
in U.S. courts.
It is hard to imagine a case more squarely international in both its
facts and ramifications. Dr. Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican national, was
accused of participating in the kidnap, torture, and murder of a U.S.
official in Mexico. A U.S. grand jury indicted him. Mexican nation-
als, at the urging of U.S. officials, kidnapped him in Mexico and
brought him to the United States. He was prosecuted in U.S. courts.
The Mexican government repeatedly protested the kidnapping and
prosecution. 55 Upon such facts one could organize a three-day con-
ference on international law, with panels on international human
rights, territorial sovereignty, extradition, national jurisdiction to pre-
scribe and enforce domestic legislation, diplomatic protection by a
state of its own nationals, and the international drug war.
How remarkable, then, to read the opinion of Alvarez-Machain:
its structure, its argument, and its supporting sources are thoroughly,
almost fanatically, domestic. The Court framed its entire opinion by
asking whether the reasoning of one previous Supreme Court case
(Ker v. lllinois56 ) rather than another (United States v. Rausche757) con-
trolled the case at bar.58 As a matter of form, international law was
not engaged at all. Nor was it engaged as a matter of substance, ex-
cept in the secondary and attenuated sense that Ker and Rauscher dis-
52 Tim Golden, After Court Ruling Mexico Tells U.S. Drug Agents to Halt Activity, N.Y.
Twis, June 16, 1992, at A19.
53 See, e.g., BROWNIE, supra note 14, at 317.
54 See infra note 68 (citing a representative sample of materials on the substantive law
of international abductions and national jurisdiction).
55 United States v. Alvarez-Machan, 504 U.S. 655, 656 (1992).
56 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
57 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
58 Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 658-64.
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cuss international law.59 The Court took Kerfor the proposition that
the abduction of a defendant does not rob a U.S. court ofjurisdiction
to try that defendant. It took Rauscher for the proposition that juris-
diction may not exist if the treatment of a defendant violates an extra-
dition treaty.60
Because the choice between Ker and Rauscher depended on
whether the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty had been violated, the
Court understandably sought guidance on how to construe treaties.
International lawyers would reflexively turn to Articles Thirty-one and
Thirty-two of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vi-
enna Convention"), 6' but the Court, just as reflexively, turned else-
where. "In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute," the Court
59 The Rauscher Court carefully examined international law. Justice Miller, writing for
the majority, examined the terms and history of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842
between England and the United States, the practice of nations regarding extradition trea-
ties, and the writings of international publicists. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 410-34. The Ker
Court, however, allowed international law to play only a minimal role in its analysis, largely
because the relevant extradition treaty "was not called into operation...." Ker, 119 U.S. at
443.
60 Alvarez-Machai, 504 U.S. at 658-64.
61 ARcLE 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall com-
prise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connec-
tion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as
an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which es-
tablishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended.
ARTicLE 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, in-
cluding the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its con-
clusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according
to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), opened for
signature May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, arts. 31, 32 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna
Convention, the document is largely a restatement of existing law and the U.S. Department
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said, "we first look to its terms to determine its meaning. '62 Every-
thing about this passage is domestic: its implied equation of domestic
statutes and international agreements; its command to look first to
the terms of the treaty (a simpler methodology than that which the
Vienna Convention describes);63 and its supporting reference to two
previous Supreme Court decisions instead of to international legal
sources. Whether or not this approach caused the Court to err in its
interpretation of the treaty, one is struck by its failure even to acknowl-
edge that the interpretation of treaties might be a matter of interna-
tional law.
The Court's citation practice further reveals its surprisingly do-
mestic perspective. International legal decisions typically include ref-
erences to treaties, historical accounts of state practice, court
decisions from several nations, and the works of publicists-all tradi-
tional sources of international law.64 The opinion in Alvarez-Machain,
however, refers almost exclusively to previous Supreme Court deci-
sions, even for propositions that, for the international lawyer, are most
naturally supported in other ways. 65 The Court made no references to
courts outside the United States, to the work of international organi-
zations, or to scholarship produced outside the United States.
Finally, the Alvarez Court simply by-passed any serious discussion
of customary international law. This is puzzling, not only because cus-
tom, along with treaty law, forms a primary source of international
law,66 but because custom has something to say about state-sponsored
abductions.67 Since there are serious disputes about the content of
of State has reported that the Vienna Convention "is recognized as the authoritative guide
to current treaty law and practice." S. Exec. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971).
62 Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 663 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985)
and Valentine v. United Stats ex. reL Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 11 (1936)).
63 The Convention's rules of interpretation are considerably more complex than the
rule the Court offered. According to the Convention, the first level of analysis involves not
only the words of the treaty (including preamble and annexes), but also contemporaneous
side agreements and the treaty's "object and purpose." Vienna Convention, supra note 61,
arts. 31(l)-(2), 32.
64 Traditional sources, generally speaking, are treaties, customary law, general princi-
ples of law, scholarship, and judicial decisions. See ICJ Statute, supra note 29, art. 38(1).
65 The first example of this practice was the Court's citation to its own cases for the
law of treaty interpretation. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Another exam-
ple appears a bit later. "In the absence of an extradition treaty, nations are under no
obligation to surrender those in their country to foreign authorities for prosecution." Al-
varez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 664 (citing United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12
(1886), and Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933)).
66 ICJ Statute, supra note 29, art. 38(1)(b); Restatement, supra note 14, § 102(1)(a).
67 E.g., Restatement, supra note 14, § 432 cmt. c ("If the unauthorized action includes
abduction of a person, the state from which the person was abducted may demand return
of the person, and international law requires that he be returned."); Restatement, supra
note 14, § 432 reporters' notes 2, 3; F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Ab-
ducted in Breach of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 407
(Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989).
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that customary law,68 one might have expected the Court to discuss
the matter at some length. Instead, the Court addressed custom in
two sentences:
Respondent and his amid may be correct that respondent's abduc-
tion was "shocking," . . . and that it may be in violation of general
international law principles. Mexico has protested the abduction of
respondent through diplomatic notes, . .. and the decision of
whether respondent should be returned to Mexico, as a matter
outside of the Treaty, is a matter for the Executive Branch.69
In this remarkable passage, the Court displayed all three forms of
judicial provincialism. First, the Court suggested that a customary vio-
lation, if shown, is properly the business of the executive branch. This
bears the mark ofjurisdictional provincialism: by sending the matter
to the executive branch, the Court left international law unvindicated
in the judicial branch. Second, the Court acknowledged, but took no
position on, the question of whether international custom has in fact
been violated. This bears the mark of doctrinal provincialism: by fail-
ing to take a position on customary international law, the court ren-
dered it impossible for that custom to provide the rule of decision.
Third, the very brevity of the passage, along with the Court's studied
sloppiness in nomenclature ("general international law principles"
must surely refer to custom), bear the mark of methodological provin-
cialism. Because international custom has no simple analogue in
American law, the Court virtually ignored its importance.
The Court's approach in Alvarez-Machain lies in stark contrast to
the work of foreign courts facing similar issues. The courts of Israel,70
South Africa,7 1 and the United Kingdom, 72 for example, found it im-
portant to review the international law regarding state-sponsored ab-
68 At least one national court has held that the international illegality of a state-spon-
sored abduction from another state robs the abducting state's courts ofjurisdiction to try
the abductee. State v. Ebrahim, 31 I.L.M. 888, 899 (S. Afr. 1992). Indeed, scholars who
have examined the issue of state-sponsored abductions have almost universally condemned
them. See e.g., Abraham Abramovsky & Steven J. Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending Alleged
Offenders Abroad: Extradition, Abduction or Irregular Rendition, 57 OR. L. REv. 51, 92 (1978);
FA Mann, supra note 67, at 420 (stating that such abductions are "bound to lead to inter-
national anarchy and friction .... ."). Nevertheless, several scholars maintain that the ille-
gality of an abduction does not rob the abducting state ofjurisdiction to try the abductee.
E.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 317; Malvina Halberstam, Agora: International Kidnapping,
86 AM.J. INTr'L L. 736, 737-38 (1992).
69 Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669 (citations omitted).
70 Attorney-General of the Govt. ofIsr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 57-76 (Dist. ct.Jeru-
salem 1961) (upholdingjurisdiction over abductee), affd, 36 I.L.R. 277, 342 (Sup. Ct. Isr.
1962).
71 Ebrahim, 31 I.L.M. at 899 (decliningjurisdiction over abductee).
72 R. v. Plymouth Magistrates' Ct., exparte Driver, 2 All E.R. 681, 695-97 (Q.B. 1985);
R. v. Bow St. Mags., ex parte Mackeson, 75 Crim. App. 24 (CA 1981).
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ductions or at least to examine the practice of other states. 73 Rare is
the case, like Alvarez-Machain, in which a national court addressing
these issues has cited only its own precedents. 74
The reasoning of Alvarez-Machain is bound to strike the interna-
tional lawyer as bordering on the perverse: How can one discuss the
proper interpretation of a treaty and not cite the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties? How can one ask whether an act violates
treaty law and, given a negative answer, not reflexively go on to ask
whether the act violates custom? How can one write an opinion in-
volving international legal issues without a single reference to sources
outside the United States?
The strangeness of the Court's approach is demonstrated by
those who have risen to defend the opinion. In one of the earliest
such defenses, for example, Professor John M. Rogers began by ob-
serving that:
There is a very respectable argument that permitting [Alvarez-
Machain's trial in the United States] is perfectly consistent with
United States obligations under customary international law, and
that no treaty has changed the customary rule. The argument is
supported by policy, as well as by international precedent.75
He went on to argue that no rule of customary international law man-
dates the return of an abducted national to his home state, and that
the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, because it failed to address abduc-
tions, did not change that result as between those two states.76 In
short, Professor Rogers made the international arguments that the
Court could have made but did not. Likewise, in the October 1992
issue of the American Journal of International Law, Professor Malvina
Halberstam ably argued, inter alia, that the "Court's holding [in Alva-
rez-Machain] is consistent with existing international law."'77 In sup-
port of that proposition she cited examples of state practice, decisions
from courts in several different countries, and the work of publicists.78
She, too, was concerned with showing that the Supreme Court could
have found support for its holding if it had consulted international
law. As students of international law, both Rogers and Halberstam felt
73 See also ReArgoud, 45 I.L.R. 90, 103 (Cass. crim. 1964) (including notation by re-
porter that French judges were willing to examine precedents from other nations);
Afouneh v. Attorney-General, 10 Ann. Dig. 327, 328 (Palestine Sup. Ct. 1942) (citing
MooRE's DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1906)).
74 Such cases do, however, exist. E.g., R. v. O./C. Depot Battalion, 1 All E.R. 373
(K.B. 1949). But even here, the English court discussed Scottish precedent. Id. at.377-78.
75 John M. Rogers, Response to President's Notes on Alvarez-Machain, ASIL NEwsL. (Am.
Soc'y Int'l L., Washington, D.C.), Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 5.
76 Id
77 Halberstam, supra note 50, at 737.
78 Id. at 737-39.
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compelled to defend the Court on grounds the Court itself either ig-
nored or left undeveloped.
Alvarez-Machain is indeed a curious case. Redolent with interna-
tional implications, it was nonetheless treated by the Supreme Court
as a domestic case, to be decided on the basis of domestic law and
precedent. This is certainly not the approach one would have ex-
pected from an international tribunal, nor, it appears, from the courts
of other nations. It is, however, an approach one might have ex-
pected from an American court, and from the Supreme Court in par-
ticular, for the Supreme Court repeats the provincialism of Alvarez-
Machain in several other recent cases.
B. Alvarez-Machain in Context: Aramco, Hartford, and Sale
1. Aramco
The issue in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.79 ("Aramcd') was
whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196480 governed a U.S.
company's employment of a U.S. citizen in Saudi Arabia. The Court
held that it did not: Congress is presumed to intend legislation to
apply only within the territory of the United States, and only a clear
expression of contrary intent can overcome that presumption.8' The
petitioners' evidence that Congress intended an extraterritorial reach
for Title VII was insufficiently clear for the Court to overturn the terri-
torial presumption.8 2
The Court treated this case as if it raised a matter of purely do-
mestic law-the proper interpretation of a congressional act.
Throughout its entire opinion, the Court cited only U.S. statutes and
cases. But it could have handled Aramco differently. International law
has generated a body of principles regarding the proper reach of na-
tional legislation-principles that bear on the ability of a nation to
prescribe conduct beyond its borders.83 The Court, therefore, could
have asked whether these principles permitted (or precluded) the ex-
traterritorial application of Title VII for which the petitioners argued.
In the alternative, the Court could have used these international rules
as an interpretive aid, asking how they might legitimately affect the
construction of a congressional statute. The Court chose neither of
79 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
80 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
81 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
82 Id at 248-58. Congress itself promptly overturned the Court's interpretation of
Tide VII, amending the law to explicitly cover the employment of U.S. nationals abroad.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1988 & Supp. In 1991).
83 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, §§ 402, 403.
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these paths and, indeed, failed even to acknowledge the existence of
applicable international rules.84
The Court concededly adopted its territorial presumption partly
out of deference to the interests of other nations and with a view to
avoiding the conflicts that might arise if U.S. laws were applied extra-
territorially.8 5 Accordingly, one might be tempted to understand the
Court as tacitly acknowledging the limits imposed by international
law. But this is not how the Court understood the matter. The Court
itself called the territorial presumption "a longstanding principle of
American law" and cited domestic precedent for support.86 Moreover,
had the Court really looked to international law for guidance, it likely
would have fashioned a different rule. The international law of pre-
scriptive jurisdiction does not restrict nations to prescribing conduct
solely within their physical borders,87 but instead recognizes the ability
of states to prescribe extraterritorial conduct if that conduct has cer-
tain other connections with the prescribing state.88 These non-territo-
rial grounds of prescriptive jurisdiction have grown so important in
recent years that contemporary international law does not readily sup-
port the Court's heavy territorial presumption.8 9
84 The Court's apparent ignorance of the international law of prescriptivejurisdiction
led it to say some odd things in its analysis:
If petitioners are correct that [Title VII] applies to employers overseas, we
see no way of distinguishing in its application between United States em-
ployers and foreign employers. Thus, a French employer of a United States
citizen in France would be subject to Title VII-a result at which even peti-
tioners balk. The EEOC assures us that in its view the term "employer"
means only "American employer," but there is no such distinction in this
statute and no indication that the EEOC in the normal course of its admin-
istration had produced a reasoned basis for such a distinction.
Aramco, 499 U.S. at 255. International law, which allows states broader regulatory powers
over their nationals, as compared to non-nationals, abroad, provides the "reasoned basis
for such a distinction." See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 402.
85 Aramco, 499 U.S. at 248.
86 Id. at 248 (emphasis added) (citing Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949)).
87 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, §§ 402, 403.
88 Subject to certain restrictions, for example, a state may regulate the conduct of its
nationals wherever they are found, and the conduct of non-nationals abroad if that con-
duct has direct and substantial effects on the prescribing state. RESTATEMENT, supra note
14, §§ 402(1) (c), 402(2) (describing as justified both the regulation of conduct outside a
state's territory that has, or is intended to have, substantial effect within its territory, and
the regulation of activities of a state's nationals outside as well as within its territory).
89 At the beginning of this century, one could more plausibly characterize interna-
tional law as limiting a state's prescriptive jurisdiction to its own territory. Today, however,
international law evidences a great deal more flexibility in assessing claims of prescriptive
jurisdiction. See, e.g., RESTATEiENT, supra note 14, §§ 402-404 (describing the bases for
prescriptive jurisdiction and the limitations on that jurisdiction, respectively); Gary B.
Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U. S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1
(1992); Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: ExtraterritorialApplication of Amefican Law, 1991 S. Or.
REv. 179, 183-84.
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In sum, the Aramco Court treated the issue before it as raising
matters of purely domestic law despite both the obvious international
implications and the existence of a relevant body of international law.
In this sense, the Aramco decision represents an even more thorough-
going example of provincialism than Alvarez-Machain, which at least
made a few passing references to international law.90
2. Hartford
The Supreme Court faced a similar issue in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California.91 In this consolidated case, nineteen states and several indi-
viduals sued a number of domestic and foreign insurance companies
alleging a conspiracy that made certain kinds of insurance coverage
unavailable to American insurance buyers.9 2 The case raised several
issues under U.S. antitrust law, but only one issue had international
ramifications.
In the relevant part of the case, several British defendants sought
to dismiss the claims against them on the ground that Section One of
the Sherman Act did not apply to their conduct outside the United
States.93 The Court treated the defense as raising issues of purely do-
mestic law-the proper interpretation of a congressional act and the
propriety of domestic judicial abstention.
The Court first turned to the interpretation of the Congressional
act. "[I] t is well established by now," said the Court, "that the Sher-
man Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and
did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States."
94
The principle, once stated, was easy to apply, since the plaintiffs had
alleged that the British defendants conspired to affect and did affect
the United States.95 The defendants next argued that the claims
against them should be dismissed on grounds of international com-
ity.96 This defense failed as well, with the Court remarking that comity
could be invoked only if there was a "true conflict between domestic
and foreign law."97 Here, it observed, there was no "true conflict" be-
cause British law did not require British insurers to act in the ways com-
plained of in the antitrust suit.98
90 E.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666-68 (1992) (mentioning
international law briefly).
91 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
92 Id. at 2895.
93 Id. at 2908-09.
94 Id. at 2909.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 2909-11.
97 Id. at 2910 (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)).
98 Id at 2911.
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The Court's discussion, both of the Sherman Antitrust Act and of
international comity, is curious in its exclusive reference to domestic
law.99 Step by step, proposition by proposition, the Court grounded
its analysis on domestic precedents and proceeded as if no interna-
tional sources or methods of analysis existed. The Court even domes-
ticated the notion of "international comity," citing only U.S.
sources. 00
As noted in the discussion of the Aramco case above,' 0 ' there
exists an international law of prescriptive jurisdiction. This law pro-
vides a set of international principles relevant to the question of
whether the Sherman Antitrust Act can or should apply to actions
outside the United States. There is also an international law ofjudi-
cial jurisdiction. It provides a set of principles describing the condi-
tions under which a state may hear disputes in its courts. 0 2 Had the
Supreme Court turned to these principles, its analysis would have pro-
ceeded differently. It would, for example, have likely begun by asking
questions of prescriptive jurisdiction: whether the traditional bases of
prescriptive jurisdiction could support the U.S. assertion of Sherman
Act liability on British insurers; 0 3 whether such an assertion was rea-
sonable;' 04 and even if reasonable, whether the interest of the United
Kingdom in regulating that same conduct was "clearly greater."'0 5
Had it found that legislative jurisdiction was justified, the Court might
then have proceeded to ask questions about judicial jurisdiction:
whether there were sufficient contacts between the defendants, their
actions, and the U.S. courts to support a U.S. court's ability to hear
the case.' 0 6
99 1& at 2909 (discussing the reach of the Sherman Act and, in doing so, citing only
U.S. cases, statutes, and treatises, along with § 415 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, which describes exclusively U.S. law in
regard to the extraterritorial effect of antitrust laws).
100 1& at 2909-11. In its comity analysis, the Court cited only U.S. cases, statutes, and
treatises. Its references to the Restatement are to § 415, by its terms a description of U.S.
law, and to § 403, the only reference arguably addressing principles of international law.
101 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
102 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 421.
103 See, e.g., id. § 402 (describing territorial location of occurrence or effect, nationality
of action, and effects on important state interests as grounds for prescriptive jurisdiction);
id. § 404 (describing the commission of certain offenses of universal concern as a ground
for prescriptive jurisdiction).
104 Id. § 403(1).
105 Id. § 403(3). This last inquiry is appropriate only if an exercise of prescriptive juris-
diction is reasonable for both nations, and "one state requires what another prohibits, or
where compliance with the regulations of two states... is otherwise impossible." Id. § 403
cmt. e. One may question whether this Restatement approach truly reflects current interna-
tional law. See, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise
of Restatement Section 403, 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 53, 54-56 (1995) (arguing that section 403 does
not reflect customary international law); PAUST, supra note 8, at 403 n.55.
106 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 421.
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The differences in approach are nicely illustrated by Justice
Scalia's dissent to this part of the case. 107 Following the Restatement's
mode of analysis, Justice Scalia focused primarily on the international
propriety of asserting Sherman Act liability against the British defend-
ants (the question of prescriptive jurisdiction). 08  This analysis led
Justice Scalia to a result different from that reached by the majority:
Justice Scalia would have interpreted the Sherman Act as failing to
reach the conduct of the British defendants and thus would have dis-
missed the case against them.10 9 One could argue about whether the
different approaches-majority and dissent-required different re-
sults on these facts, 110 but Scalia's dissent suggests that different re-
sults are certainly possible. As such, it is even more startling that the
majority flatly omitted any reference to the relevant international
rules.
3. Sale
The Court had a more difficult time ignoring international law in
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc."' In Sale, the respondents chal-
lenged President Clinton's order directing the Coast Guard to inter-
dict Haitians on the high seas and return them to Haiti without first
determining whether they qualified as refugees. 112 Issues of both do-
mestic and international law were clearly raised since both bodies of
law accord special rights to refugees. The Immigration and National-
ity Act of 1952113 (the "Immigration Act") contains the relevant do-
mestic rules. The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1 4 (the
"Protocol"), a treaty to which the United States is a party, contains the
relevant international rules.
Yet the Court found it hard to acknowledge the international is-
sue. "The question presented in this case," the Court began, "is
whether such forced repatriation, 'authorized to be undertaken only
beyond the territorial sea of the United States,' violates §243(h) (1) of
107 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct 2891, 2917-22 (1993) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting in part).
108 Id. at 2918-21.
109 Id. at 2921, 2922. From Scalia's viewpoint, the majority's focus on comity and the
question of whether American courts should abstain from hearing a case against foreign
defendants, was "simply misdirected." id. at 2921.
110 See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise ofJuris-
diction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust CasM4 89 AM.J. INT'L L. 42, 50 (1995)
(expressing uncertainty on how case should have been decided under the Restatement's
analysis).
111 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993).
112 Id. at 2552.
113 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980,
8 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1988).
114 Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.IAS. No. 6577.
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the [Immigration Act]."11 5 This formulation of the question is odd,
given the obvious relevance of international law and, moreover, given
the Court's holding, in the next sentence, that neither the Immigra-
tion Act nor the Protocol applied to the Coast Guard's actions.1 1 6
The Court's first statement of the question presented, bereft of
any reference to international law, might be viewed as an inadvertent
omission. After all, the Court devoted a substantial part of its opinion
to the international question." 7 Still, the omission is significant, be-
cause it telegraphs the Court's ambivalence about international law.
Specifically, it signals the Court's inability to decide whether the Pro-
tocol needs to be discussed at all, and if so, exactly why.
The Court introduced its discussion of the Protocol as follows:
[B]ecause the history of the [Immigration Act] ... does disclose a
general intent to conform our law to [the Protocol] .... it might be
argued that the extraterritorial obligations imposed by [the Proto-
col] were so clear that Congress, in acceding to the Protocol, and
then in amending the statute to harmonize the two, meant to give
the latter a correspondingly extraterritorial effect. Or, ... [the Pro-
tocol] might have established an extraterritorial obligation which
the statute does not; under the Supremacy Clause, that broader
treaty obligation might then provide the controlling rule of law.
With those possibilities in mind we shall consider both the text and
negotiating history of the Convention itself."18
The passage is remarkably indecisive. The Court did not commit itself
on the treaty's precise relevance. The Court merely suggested pos-
sibilities for the Protocol's relevance and "with those . . . in mind"
proceeded to discuss it. A court that took the treaty seriously would
state clearly how it fit in the logic of the decision." 9
Commentators have described the Court's holding-that the Pro-
tocol's obligations do not apply to actions of the United States taken
outside its territorial boundaries-as "eccentric, highly implausi-
ble," 20 and "seriously flawed,"'121 and by Justice Blackmun, the sole
115 SaI4 113 S. Ct. at 2552 (foomote omitted).
116 Id.
117 Id at 2562-67.
118 Id at 2562 (emphasis added) (foomote omitted).
119 Lower courts had held that respondents could not invoke the Protocol because it
was not "self-executing." M at 2556-57. This, along with later Congressional action-the
relevant provisions of the Immigration Act-certainly muddied the Protocol's status in the
Sale litigation. The crucial point, however, is that the Court side-stepped these issues
rather than tackling them directly.
120 Louis Henkin, Notesfrom the Presiden ASIL NEwsL (Am. Soc'y Int'l L., Washington,
D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 7.
121 Thomas D.Jones, Intemational Decision, 88 AM.J. INT'L L. 114, 126 (1994).
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dissenter in Sale, as "extraordinary."'122 But like the other cases re-
viewed here, the real significance of the Court's opinion lies not in
the substance of its holding, but in the approach. 123
The case squarely presented an issue of treaty interpretation, an
issue for which the international law of treaties is undoubtedly rele-
vant. And yet the majority never mentioned the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, nor, for that matter, any other source on the
international law of treaties. 124 Instead, the Court proceeded on ex-
actly the same grounds, using exactly the same methods, as one would
expect a court to pursue in a purely domestic case of statutory inter-
pretation. It examined the text and its negotiating history.125 But the
international rules of treaty interpretation differ from the domestic
rules of statutory interpretation. 126 Justice Blackmun's dissent care-
fully demonstrated how those differences in approach could have led
to a different result.127
C. The Lessons
These four cases-Alvarez-Machain, Aramco, Hartford, and Sale--do
more than demonstrate the consistency of the Supreme Court's pro-
vincialism; they illustrate how each of provincialism's forms actually
manifests itself in the work of U.S. courts. In Alvarez-Machain, the
Court suggested that the existence of a customary law violation and its
possible remedy are properly left to the executive branch12 8-a clear
example ofjurisdictional provincialism. The same form of provincial-
ism played a role in Sale. At the end of that opinion, the Court sug-
gested that its territorial reading of the Immigration Act and the
Protocol was particularly justified because the situation involved "for-
eign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsi-
bility."129 Then, quoting an earlier case from the D.C. Circuit, the
Court concluded that "[a]lthough the human crisis is compelling,
there is no solution to be found in ajudicial remedy."' 30 This fatalis-
tic willingness to leave international law unvindicated in the courts
122 Sale 113 S. Ct. at 2568 (Blackmun,J., dissenting); see also Blackmun, supra note 47,
at 43-45 (discussing the Sale case and concluding that the Court's decision renders the
Refugee Convention "a cruel hoax").
123 An approach Justice Blackmun in dissent labeled, by turns, "unsupported," "pecu-
liar," and "flawed." Id at 2569-70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
124 Cf. id at 2569 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the Vienna Convention).
125 Id. at 2563-67.
126 See supra note 63.
127 Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2569-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
128 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992).
129 113 S. Ct at 2567.
130 Id. (quoting Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 841 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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because the executive branch is available to deal with the problem
forms a recurrent theme in American jurisprudence.
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court was unwilling to find the
existence of a customary rule regarding abductions, 131 and this unwill-
ingness effectively prevented the Court from applying customary law
as its rule of decision-a clear example of doctrinal provincialism.
The same form of provincialism appeared in Aramco, Hartford, and
Sale. In each case, there existed a relevant body of international law
that the Court could have cited, discussed, and applied. In each case,
however, the Court proceeded as if the only relevant question was the
proper interpretation of a congressional act. One might speculate
that the Court's repeated willingness to by-pass international analysis
pays subtle homage to the rules that later congressional acts trump
prior treaty and customary law. There is little point in discussing in-
ternational law or determining its content if congressional action will
ultimately control. This suggests that the rules constituting doctrinal
provincialism work on at least two levels: they cause courts explicitly
to reject international rules in favor of domestic ones, and, more sub-
tly, they discourage courts from explicating international rules in the
first place.
The recurring judicial argument that the executive branch can
best resolve international legal problems, together with the existence
of many rules that prevent international law from providing the rule
of decision in American cases, encourage courts to treat international
cases as if they were domestic ones. In this manner, jurisdictional and
doctrinal provincialism feed a provincialism of method. Indeed,
methodological provincialism is the most striking feature of the four
cases just reviewed. In case after case, each with obvious international
ramifications, the Supreme Court asked domestic questions, cited do-
mestic precedents, and gave domestic answers.
III
WHY PROVINCIALISM IS A PROBLEM
Provincialism is destructive. It harms litigants, damages courts
and hurts the United States as a whole. It corrodes international law
and undercuts the rule of law. But it does not do so all at once. The
different forms of provincialism breed characteristically different
harms, and a proper assessment of provincialism must take account of
these differences.
131 See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 666-67.
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A. The Harms of Methodological Provincialism
The peculiar harm of methodological provincialism is the embar-
rassment of error. The practice of treating international cases or in-
ternational law in purely domestic terms is simply a mistake. Domestic
law and international law are different, and to treat them the same is
to confuse two distinct systems of law. Most of this confusion appears
to stem from ignorance. For example, a court might mishandle the
sources of international law based on an assumption that they resem-
ble domestic sources.132 Mistakes based on ignorance, of course, re-
flect badly on the courts, because they suggest carelessness or
incompetence. Yet methodological provincialism is no less harmful
when it results from deliberate decisions to exclude relevant interna-
tional legal analysis or to apply domestic methods to international
materials. 133 These are still errors; willfulness only adds to the vice of
their commission.
If mistakes of method do not affect the outcome of a case, the
harm stops at the embarrassment of ajob poorly done. If, in contrast,
mistakes of method do affect the outcome of a case, the harms begin
to mount. In addition to the embarrassment of error, one must add
harm to a litigant who should have won but did not; harm to the
United States, which may incur liability for the violation of one of its
international obligations; and the harm to international law, which
goes unvindicated.13 4 Each of these harms, more characteristic of
doctrinal provincialism, will be discussed presently.
B. The Harms of Doctrinal Provincialism
1. A Short Survey
Typically, doctrinal provincialism arises when rules from both in-
ternational law and domestic law are known to a court and the court
consciously chooses to apply the latter. 3 5 There is here no "embar-
rassment of error" of the type associated with methodological provin-
cialism. Nevertheless, the court's conscious choice to apply domestic
rules is likely to determine the outcome of the case; if it did not, there
would be little reason to make the choice at all. Contrary domestic
law having been applied, international rights are left unvindicated or
132 See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
133 See infra part IVA (suggesting that the reasons behind a willful adoption of meth-
odological provincialism-xenophobia, sloth and rhetorical advantage-deserve no more
praise than ignorance).
134 See infra part HI.B.
135 See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 193 (1888) (domestic legislation su-
persedes treaty obligation); Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)
(domestic law controls when a treaty is not self-executing).
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international obligations are left unenforced. This invites several dis-
tinct harms.
a. Harm to Deserving Litigants
Generally speaking, the law recognizes that persons are entitled
to redress when they suffer harm from the illegal acts of others.136
That principle is violated, however, when a litigant fails to gain redress
for government actions that breach a treaty obligation on the ground
either that the treaty is not self-executing 3 7 or that it has been super-
seded by later congressional legislation.' 38 The principle is likewise
violated when a litigant fails to gain redress for government actions
that violate customary international law on the ground that control-
ling executive action has superseded the custom.'3 9 In each case, the
wrongdoer escapes the consequences of its illegal conduct and the
victim is left without legal remedy.
b. Harm to the United States
When a U.S. court fails to vindicate an international right or to
enforce an international obligation, the court's failure is attributed to
the nation as a whole, and the nation is held responsible. 4° The
court's failure may itself violate international law,14 1 or, more com-
136 In regard to domestic law: "As a general principle, whenever there is a wrongful
breach of an agreement or invasion of a right, the law infers some damage, and the inno-
cent person should have a remedy." MARTIN WEINSTEIN, SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAW 190
(3d ed. 2d prig. 1989). A similar rule applies in the international system. See, e.g., HENKIN
Er AL., supra note 6, at 544-45.
137 E.g., Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 50 (1913) (treaty on in-
dustrial property); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir.) (Convention on the
High Seas), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Robertson v. General Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495
(4th Cir.) (patent provision in Treaty of Versailles), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 571 (1929).
138 E.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600-01 (1889) (congressional
act excluding Chinese nationals supersedes prior treaty with China); Committee of U.S.
Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (determining later
congressional funding of contras supersedes prior treaty obligation under U.N. Charter);
Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461,465 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (ruling later congressional statute super-
sedes U.N. Security Council embargo on Rhodesian products), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973); Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 667-68 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (finding later congressional
statute supersedes prior treaty with Germany), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960).
139 E.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889
(1986).
140 RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 115(1) (b) (stating thatjudicial preference for later
congressional act does not relieve U.S. of its international obligations or of the conse-
quences for violations of those obligations); BROWNLIE, upra note 14, at 449-50, 529-30
(arguing that actions of national courts can engage state's international responsibility).
141 The international wrong, "denial ofjustice," is peculiarly the province of a nation's
courts. States are responsible for injuries to aliens resulting from: "a denial, unwarranted
delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross deficiency in the administration ofjudicial or
remedial process ... or a manifestly unjustjudgrnent." HARvARD LAw SCHOOL, RESEARCH
IN INTERNATIONAL LAw: THE LAW OF RESPONSIBILrY OF STATES FOR DAMAGE DONE IN THEIR
TERRITORY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY OF FOREIGNERS, art. 9 (1929), repinted in 23 AM.J.
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monly, preclude it from correcting or ameliorating presidential and
congressional violations. When Congress passes a law that is inconsis-
tent with one of the United States' international obligations, courts
can ameliorate-or even eradicate-the harm by refusing to enforce
the legislation. But they cannot do so if they take the position that
later congressional legislation supersedes treaty and customary law.' 42
When the President or other members of the executive branch violate
the United States' international obligations, the courts can ameliorate
the harm by refusing to enforce the offending directive in court, by
enjoining the executive branch from taking enforcement action on its
own, or by awarding damages to the harmed plaintiffs. But they can-
not do so if they take the position that executive action trumps treaty
or custom, 1 4 3 or if they are hesitant to find the existence of any cus-
tom at all.1"'
A doctrinal provincialism that increases the frequency of U.S. vio-
lations of international law has important consequences. The first is
reputational. Throughout its history, the United States has publicly
supported the rule of law in international affairs. 145 Judicial policies
that create or countenance violations of international law obviously
undercut the nation's credibility on this point.146 In addition, these
violations sometimes cost money: reparations must be paid, or money
must be spent to return a situation to the status quo ante. 147 Some-
times the cost inheres in suffering the retaliatory action of an of-
fended state. 148 Sometimes the cost is more indirect, but no less
real-such as the creation of ill-will among allies-a cost paid in fu-
ture relations with the governments concerned) 49
INT'L L. 173 (Special Supp. 1929). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 711(b) cmt. a
(on denial ofjustice); BROWNLIE, supra note 14, at 529-30 (same).
142 See supra notes 31, 34 (citing cases taking that position).
143 See Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1453 (ruling that executive action trumps customary
international law).
144 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
145 See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 53, 62-63 (2d
ed. 1979).
146 See id. at 52.
147 International law firmly establishes the requirement of reparations. E.g., Repara-
tion for Injuries Suffered in Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.CJ., Report of Judg-
ments, Advisory Opinions with Orders, 174, 181 (Apr. 11) (Advisory Opinion); Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 9); Factory at Chorzow (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928
P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 17, at 47-48 (Sept. 13); Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July 26). See also F.A Mann, The Consequences of an International Wrong
in International and National Law, 48 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1976-77).
148 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 905 (describing countermeasures in response to
international legal violations);JuLius STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
288-93 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1973) (1954) (describing responsive methods short of
war); ELISABETH ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH U.S. LEGISLATION 135-
67 (1985) (describing unilateral measures with special reference to U.S. practice).
149 In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Alvarez-Machain, for example, the
government of Mexico threatened to halt its cooperation with the United States in drug
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c. Harm to United States Courts
Doctrinal provincialism visits a special harm on U.S. courts. At
base, it tends to involve them in violations of law by causing them
either to violate international law themselves or to countenance such
violations by the executive and legislative branches. But a court must
always stand, ultimately, for the rule of law. When it does not, it loses
its distinctive character, and thereby its distinctive worth, as an
institution. 150
This harm is so easily stated that its significance can be over-
looked. The value of courts as courts lies precisely in their dedication
to the rule of law. They find their primary justification as a separate
institution in their willingness to support law and the lawful resolution
of disputes. When, instead, they countenance illegality, when they ap-
proach the resolution of disputes with the same casualness about the
rule of law that sometimes marks other political institutions, they fail
in the very duty that distinguishes them from others.
d. Harm to International Law
Doctrinal provincialism harms international law in two ways.
First, it chokes off an important method of enforcement. Historically,
municipal courts have played an important role in the enforcement of
international law, and that importance is likely to continue in the fu-
ture.151 When U.S. courts refuse to apply international law, they help
to debilitate one of its most important enforcement mechanisms.
Second, doctrinal provincialism corrodes the very system of inter-
national law. The efficacy, and even existence, of any legal system de-
pends on the general willingness of its subjects to obey its norms.
International law is no different in this regard, and, indeed, the small
number and nature of its subjects magnifies the importance of each
subject's behavior-.152 Any course of conduct that repeatedly violates
international law, or that condones its violation, not only destabilizes
the laws that are broken, but destabilizes the system as a whole. The
control efforts and sent a Mexican patrol into U.S. territory, without U.S. consent, to arrest
a fugitive. Bush, supra note 50, at 971; see supra part ilA (discussing Alvarez-Machain).
Nations not directly involved in the abduction have also threatened a chilling of relations
with the United States. See Bush, supra note 50, at 942; Stewart, supra note 51, at 50.
150 See Edward D. Re, Human Rights, Domestic Courts, and Effective Remedies, 67 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 581,592 (1993) (warning that "courts cannot risk the fate of becoming irrelevant in
their crucial role of applying the law as an instrument ofjustice.").
151 See, e.g., BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
LEGAL SysmMs 8-9 (Rene Provost trans., 1993); RicHARD A. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC
COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER Xi-Xii (1964).
152 See, e.g., Stanley Hoffiann, International Law and the Control of Force, in THE RELE-
vANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 21, 34-41 (Karl W. Deutsch & Stanley Hoffmann eds., 1971).
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doctrinal provincialism of U.S. courts clearly harms the international
system.
2. Discounting the Harms, and the Limits ofjudicial Indfference
The harms of doctrinal provincialism-to litigants, to the courts,
to the United States, and to international law-are well known and
largely undisputed. The real issue is their seriousness: are these bad
things all that bad?
Consider first the harm to international law. The importance of
international law is, perhaps, self-evident to most readers of this jour-
nal, and harm to it presumptively bad. An important intellectual tra-
dition, however, holds that the rule of law is not-or ought not be-
relevant to the behavior of states. Instead, power and national interest
(suitably defined) governs-or ought to govern-the relations of
states.153 This tradition is founded upon serious thinking about poli-
tics and law and is understandably attractive to those who reside in
(and help to govern) the most powerful nation on earth. An argu-
ment against doctrinal provincialism, based on its harm to interna-
tional law, simply will not persuade thinkers in this tradition.
Doctrinal provincialism's harms to the United States, to its courts,
and to its litigants can be discounted in similar ways. If one seriously
doubts the importance of international law, or seriously doubts the
prudence of promoting it, then increased violations of that law will be
of little consequence. Any resulting harm to the United States or to
its courts is discounted. Any sense of injustice to litigants is dimin-
ished for they lose nothing they "should have" received.
But can courts take these views? Although one can understand
the political or diplomatic inclination to deny the existence or to dis-
count the importance of international law, courts begin with different
assumptions. Law-denying or law-minimizing views have little place in
an institution dedicated to the rule of law. It is thus not terribly sur-
prising that the language of The Paquete Habana54 has found
resonance in U.S. courts. International law, the Court there instructs,
"must be ascertained and administered by the courts ofjustice of ap-
153 This view of international relations, usually called "realism," was famously devel-
oped and defended in Hans Morgenthau's classic 1948 book, Politics AmongNations, now in
its sixth edition. HANs J. MORGENTHAU & KENNETH W. THOMPSON, POLmcs AMONG NA-
TIONS (6th ed. 1985). Although the realist view has suffered serious criticism over the past
40 years, it still dominates the works of political scientists, who, in the face of the criticism,
either modify it ("neorealism"), or reject it in favor of other theories (e.g., "multilateral-
ism" or "liberal institutionalism"). See, e.g., NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert 0. Keo-
hane ed., 1986) (presenting challenges to realist claims); see also, e.g., MULTLATERALISM
MATRs (John G. Ruggie ed., 1993) (exploring the multilateralism concept); NEO-REAuSM
AND NEo-LamERAIisM (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) (exploring neo-realist and neo-liberal
theory).
154 175 U.S. 677 (1990).
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propriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon
it are duly presented for their determination." 55 If, in our courts'
own traditions, international law is not only law, but our law, then the
harms of doctrinal provincialism return in full virulence. A court
must be concerned if its actions place the United States in violation of
international law. A court must be concerned if it finds itself support-
ing the international violations of the Congress or the President. A
court must be concerned if it turns away litigants with legitimate
claims based on international law.
C. The Harms ofJurisdictional Provincialism
1. The Old Harms, Revisited
When a court refuses to hear a case with international implica-
tions, it risks the same sort of harms-to litigants, to the court itself, to
the United States, and to international law-as when it chooses to ap-
ply domestic law in preference to applicable international law. But
unlike the case of doctrinal provincialism, these harms are
contingent.
Litigants are harmed only when their claims are well-founded in
international law and they are nonetheless turned away. If their
claims are not well-founded, a court's refusal to hear the case does not
rob the litigants of a remedy they would otherwise have received. The
courts are harmed only when they act callously or opportunistically:
because they do not reach the merits of a given case, they are not put
in the position, explicitly, of themselves violating international law or
condoning its violation by others; they can only be suspected of disre-
garding the effects of their actions, or intending to achieve an unwor-
thy end by a "neutral" procedural means. The United States is
harmed only when the court's refusal to hear a case itself violates in-
ternational law (an unlikely circumstance, because international law
seldom requires a nation's courts to hear particular cases) 156 or when,
because of that refusal, a previous U.S. violation of international law
remains unvindicated. Finally, international law is harmed only when
it was both relevant to the case and in fact violated: only then is inter-
national law "unvindicated."
The harms generated by a court's refusal to hear an international
case are not only contingent, but speculative as well. The harms de-
pend on certain facts about the case at hand, facts that are typically
determined at the merits stage of a proceeding. Because the court, by
definition, does not reach the merits, the existence of these facts is
uncertain. In any particular case, it will be a matter for argument, for
155 Id. at 700.
156 See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
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example, whether a rule of international law was properly applicable,
whether it had been violated, and what the proper remedy might have
been. One cannot be sure that an injustice was done, or that the
United States violated international law, or that international law was
left unvindicated.
Marked by contingency and speculation, the harms of jurisdic-
tional provincialism are easy to discount. Still, when a court refuses to
hear an international case, it inevitably risks harms to the litigants, to
the courts, to the United States, and to international law. One must
suppose, therefore, that these harms sometimes occur. An increased
willingness to hear international cases would reduce the risk of harm
and the frequency of its actual occurrence.157
2. Harm to the Rule of Law
As the previous subsection demonstrated, jurisdictional provin-
cialism risks the same kinds of harms as doctrinal provincialism, albeit
more contingently and speculatively. A court's refusal to hear interna-
tional cases also risks a harm not found in provincialism's other forms.
When a court consciously chooses to apply domestic law instead of
international law to a case (the mark of doctrinal provincialism), it
still chooses to apply law. When a court refuses to hear the case at all
(the mark of jurisdictional provincialism), it reduces the chances of a
lawful settlement. In this way, the court harms the rule of law.
If legal rights go unvindicated in U.S. courts, they may not be
vindicated at all, resulting in an indisputable loss of justice.' 58
Although other courts, foreign or international, may eventually vindi-
cate those rights, a U.S. court has no assurance of this result when it
simply refuses to hear the case. In addition, a delay in justice is una-
voidable. Cases rejected by U.S. courts may be settled outside of
courts, but the judicial settlement of disputes has special virtues: a
unique concern for rules, consistently applied, and for fairness to the
parties. Judicial settlement is also peaceful-an important advantage
in the international system, a system in which self-help is well-ac-
cepted, many of the players are armed, and those who choose to fight
157 There are dangers, of course, in an overzealous willingness to hear international
cases. An overeager court might, for example, overstep its legitimate authority to hear a
case under international law. See REs-rATEMEWT, supra note 14, § 421 (describing limitations
on jurisdiction to adjudicate). And a court, having decided to hear an international case,
might get the law wrong, harming an innocent litigant and placing the United States in
violation of its international obligations. Such consequences arguably followed the
Supreme Court's decisions in Alvarez-Machain, Hartford, and SaI4 discussed supra part ll.B.
158 This is justice as compensation, not justice as fairness, although the two concep-
tions are related. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1667 (2d ed. 1994); see a/sOJOHN
RAwLs, A THEORY OFJuSTicE 3-9 (1971) (contrastingjustice as fairness with compensatory
justice); ERNFsTJ. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRiVATE LAw 61-63 (distinguishing between correc-
tive and distributive justice).
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are seldom the ones who die. It would be ludicrous to suggest that
each exercise of jurisdictional provincialism risks war, but it does risk
injustice, and a delay in justice is almost assured.
IV
THE CAUSES OF PROVINCIALISM
(AND THE WISDOM OF A CURE)
Judicial provincialism is a puzzling phenomenon. It risks many
harms, the bulk of which are particularly unsettling for courts.159 It
flies in the face of constitutional160 and Supreme Court161 language
that seems to thrust international law directly into the American
courtroom. And, it suggests an obliviousness both to the growing
stream of transnational intercourse and to the burgeoning corpus of
international law that regulates it.162 Why, then, does provincialism
flourish? Why is it that, when one turns to American cases, one sees
international law blocked, side-stepped, or ignored at almost every
turn?
The first answer is that, despite its growing relevance and its for-
mal acceptance in the U.S. legal system, international law is burdened
by several features that render it an unlikely source of guidance in
domestic litigation.
(1) It is unknown. Few judges and lawyers approach their work
with a solid grounding in the substance and methods of interna-
tional law.
(2) It is not raised. Even if known, lawyers seldom have an interest
in pressing the international legal aspects of a case and judges sel-
dom have an interest in raising them on their own.
(3) It is unusual. Both lawyers and judges lack experience in han-
dling international issues and are ill-disposed to explore unfamiliar
territory.
(4) It is foreign. International law comes from abroad and may
not be well-fitted to the American experience.
(5) It is undemocratic. International law is generated in ways far
removed from the citizens of the United States and, indeed, from
the citizens of other nations.
(6) It is not law. International law is generated in ways that call
into question its status as "law."
(7) It is not applicable. International law speaks primarily to
states, which are seldom litigants.
159 See supra part III.
160 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2 (Treaties are "the supreme Law of the Land.").
161 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (describing international law as
"part of our law").
162 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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(8) It is trumped by domestic law. The actions of domestic institu-
tions have long been held to supersede international law in a variety
of circumstances.
(9) It is not persuasive. Given a lack of notoriety and dubious rele-
vance, international law is not nearly so persuasive a ground ofjudg-
ment as domestic law.
(10) It is not appropriate. The determination and application of
international law is more properly left to others: the executive, the
legislature, foreign courts, or international tribunals.
This heady mix of reasons-founded upon considerations as
wide-ranging as practical experience, philosophical rumination, legal
doctrine, and raw xenophobia-help to explain why judges seem al-
most reflexively to eschew international law. It should not surprise us
that men and women of practical affairs are reluctant to pursue a line
of analysis about which they know little, which is seldom brought to
their attention, whose mastery requires a substantial investment of
time, and whose ultimate usefulness is open to question.
Taken together, this list helps to explain, in a general way, why
U.S. judges are inclined to ignore or to side-step international law.
But a deeper analysis is warranted. As we have seen, international law
is marginalized in three distinct ways. Each form of provincialism
grows out of a particular context and has developed for characteristi-
cally different reasons. Sorting out those contexts and reasons is im-
portant, not only for analytical precision, but for what it tells us about
the likelihood-and wisdom-of change.
A. Methodological Provincialism
The tendency to treat international cases as if they were domestic
ones grows primarily out of ignorance. Courts often fail to address
the international legal aspects of a case because they are unaware of
them. Courts often misapprehend the sources of international law, or
mishandle international materials, because they assume that the
sources and methods of international law are the same as domestic
sources and methods. 163
The four Supreme Court cases reviewed in Part II-Alvarez-
Machain, Aramco, Hartford, and Sale--suggest, however, that there is
more to methodological provincialism than ignorance. It simply does
not seem plausible to attribute to four successive majorities of the
Supreme Court an unfamiliarity with international law generally, or
163 Judges, of course, do not deserve the sole blame for this ignorance. The responsi-
bility lies also with lawyers, who fail to raise relevant international issues or who themselves
mishandle the sources; with law clerks, on whose thoroughness of research and analysis
judges must often rely; and with law professors, who bear an obligation to equip the bench
and bar with the knowledge and tools needed for their work.
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with the specific rules of international law relevant to those decisions.
Dissents in at least two of the cases164 demonstrate that some of the
Justices were aware of these matters, and indicate that the Court as a
whole had the relevant knowledge or the means to obtain it.
A lack of seasoning, rather than a lack of knowledge, may there-
fore explain many mistakes of method. International cases are rare in
any court, even the Supreme Court.165 Because the structure,
method, and citation practice of domestic legal argument is far more
familiar to our courts than those of international law, it is quite natu-
ral for our courts to fall into the more familiar patterns of thought
and analysis even when they know that international law is at issue.
But lack of seasoning may not explain all judicial errors. In read-
ing cases like Alvarez-Machain, Aramco, Hartford, and Sale, one is
tempted to conclude thatjudges sometimes make deliberate-though
unannounced-decisions to exclude international legal issues from
consideration or to apply to those issues a domestic methodology.
This suggestion, however, leads down a dark and messy path. For
what reasons might a court deliberately choose to ignore international
law or argue about it as if it were a species of domestic law? Such a
court might be motivated by a general suspicion of things foreign, an
unwillingness to spend the time needed to uncover and analyze inter-
national materials, or a fear that international argument, even if cor-
rect, will be unpersuasive. But xenophobia, sloth, and rhetorical
expediency are not the sorts of motivations one properly attributes to
judges. Faced with unexplained examples of methodological provin-
cialism, a presumption of good faith suggests that we attribute mis-
takes to a lack of knowledge or seasoning.
The causes underlying methodological provincialism suggest that
it is, in principle, very easy to change. Lack of knowledge and lack of
164 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2917-22 (1993) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting in part); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2549, 2567-77 (1993) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting).
165 Although counting international cases is no science, the Supreme Court seems to
be averaging two substantive opinions per year. In the past five years, for example, the
Court has decided the four cases discussed in Part II, along with six others: Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993) (foreign sovereign immunity); Argentina v. Weltover, 504
U.S. 607 (1992) (foreign sovereign immunity); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530
(1991) (Warsaw Convention); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (ex-
traterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment); W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environ-
mental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990) (act of state doctrine); Argentine Rep. v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989) (jurisdiction). The total number of
signed, written opinions by the Supreme Court has been running at something over 100
opinions per term. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV. L. REv.
144, 376 (1993) (reporting 114 written opinions during 1992 term); The Supreme Court,
1991 Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARv. L. Rrv. 163, 382 (1992) (reporting 114 written opin-
ions during 1991 term); cf. LEE EPSTEIN Er AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 73
(1994) (number of signed opinions during the 1989-92 terms ranged from 107 to 129).
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seasoning have straightforward antidotes: education and practice.
Judges and lawyers alike need a serious education in international law,
beginning in law school and continuing with post-graduate train-
ing.166 An effective educational effort would take money and commit-
ment, and for that reason may be slow to develop and hard to sustain,
but it is in form eminently possible and perfectly fitted to the chal-
lenge of reducing methodological provincialism. No precedents need
to be overturned, no venerable theories of American government
need to be attacked and discarded; nothing is needed but a simple
spreading of the word.
The causes underlying methodological provincialism also suggest
that it should be changed. Although its harms can be discounted,
there is nothing on the other side of the balance to justify the prac-
tice. A lack ofjudicial knowledge (or sloth, xenophobia, or rhetorical
expediency) might explain or account for errors of method, but do
not justify them. When all the explanatory clutter is cleared away, a
mistake is still a mistake. This makes easy work of the normative analy-
sis: methodological provincialism is unambiguously bad.
B. Doctrinal Provincialism
Doctrinal provincialism-the tendency to exclude international
rules as the rules of decision in American cases-presents a different
situation. It does not grow out of ignorance. It instead reflects seri-
ous thinking about the role of international law in the domestic legal
system. Each element of doctrinal provincialism fleshes out the mean-
ing of the claim that "[i]nternational law is part of our law.' 67 Do
treaties come in? If so, under what circumstances? Are U.S. courts to
apply international custom? If so, when?168
The answers are informed by jurisprudence, the Constitution,
and international law itself. Such grounds are not as easy to condemn
as ignorance and, if found wanting, are harder to correct. Any change
will require a rethinking of some longstanding, traditional views on
jurisprudence and American government. Furthermore, traditions
often find expression in precedent, and the modification or reversal
of precedent is never an easy task. Still, as I will argue, change is both
166 Part V sketches the outline of such a program. See infra Part V.
167 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 623 (1983) (citing Paquete Ha-
bana); Skiriotes v. Florida, 318 U.S. 69, 72 (1941) (same).
168 See generally Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the
United States (pt. 1), 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26 (1952) (reviewing the progress and position of
the law of nations in the United States); Henkin, supra note 31 (examining the integration
of international and domestic law); Harold H. Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of Inter-
national Law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1932) (same).
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possible and desirable. There are many harms in doctrinal provincial-
ism and its grounds are not nearly so firm as is often imagined.
1. The Jurisprudential Sources
Reflections about the nature of law and, more specifically, the
proper conceptual relation between international and domestic law,
play a large role in doctrinal provincialism. For many years, these re-
flections were characterized by a metaphysical debate between mo-
nists and dualists: a debate between those who posit the existence of
just one legal system, of which international law and national law are
constituent parts, and those who posit the existence of several legal
systems, each with its own ability to set the conditions under which it
takes account of the others.1 69 The debate has grown stale in recent
years, not only because lawyers have a limited attention span for meta-
physics, but because the dualists soundly thrashed the monists. 70
But the dualist victory did not answer the substantive question; it
simply settled the question's form: under what conditions, and in
what ways, will U.S. law take account of international law? In answer-
ing this question, conceptual reasoning remains important. Indeed,
two lines of jurisprudential thought have greatly influenced U.S.
courts' treatment of international law. The following subsections ex-
amine them in turn.
a. Positivism
Over 150 years ago, John Austin famously declared that law, prop-
erly so called, consisted of the commands of a sovereign.' 7 ' Today,
commands of the sovereign are understood to mean the authoritative
pronouncements of the lawfully constituted government of a state. i7 2
Law, from the positivist perspective, is contingent, essentially political,
and properly separated from morality. In both its earliest and current
169 See, e.g., HANs KILsE, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 363-88 (Anders
Wedberg trans., Atheneum Publishers, Inc. 1961) (1945); ALF Ross, A TEXTBOOK OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 59-73 (1947); Edwin Borchard, Relation Between International Law and Munici-
pal Law, 27 VA. L. REV. 137 (1940); J.G. Stark, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of
International Law, 1936 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 66.
170 SeeJAs, supra note 32, at 83-84.
171 JOHN AusTrN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 198-99 (1832) ("Every
positive law, or every law simply and strictly so called, is set by a sovereign person, or a
sovereign body of persons .... ").
172 See Beau James Brock, Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissance of Positivism and Pre-
dictability in Constitutional Adjudication, 51 LA. L. REV. 623, 632 (1991) ("The legal positivist
holds that only positive law, those juridical norms which have been established by the au-
thority of the state, is law."); Reginald Parker, Legal Positivism, 32 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 31,
35 (1956) (arguing only positive law is law, and "positive law" means those legal norms
created by authority of the state; thus everything state authority creates is law). Leading
contemporary formulations of positivism can be found in HART, supra note 158 andJosEPH
RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SxYSTm (2d ed. 1980).
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versions, positivism finds law by examining the law-making activity of
government officials and never (as natural law theory sometimes
does) by reasoning deductively from first principles. 173 So under-
stood, positivism is the working faith of most contemporary lawyers
andjudges.' 74
This view, unremarkable in many of its ramifications, has impor-
tant consequences for international law. It calls into question the very
status of that law and thus provides the groundwork upon which doc-
trinal provincialism can flourish. There is, in the international system,
neither a sovereign to issue commands nor a supranational state
whose organs issue authoritative pronouncements of law.175 This sug-
gests that international law is not law at all, but something else; Austin,
in fact, called it "positive morality."1 76
For the positivist, international law founded on custom or gen-
eral principles of law is especially suspect. Treaties are based on the
explicit consent of the states concerned-based, that is, on affirmative
acts of sovereign states. Although they do not arise out of a suprana-
tional government, and thus remain questionable, treaties can be un-
derstood to make law in the same way that private individuals, by
contract, make law in a domestic system. Custom and general princi-
ples of law, in contrast, are doubly disabled. Not only do they fail, like
treaties, to issue from a supranational authority, but their modes of
creation (state practice and opiniojuris, and the concordant internal
practices of civilized nations) do not constitute authoritative, govern-
mental pronouncements of international legal judgments or rules.
173 In Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court stated:
But law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without
some definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced
in a State... is not the common law generally but the law of that State
existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may have
been in England or anywhere else.
The authority and only authority is the State.
Erie Ry. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); cf. 1 WILUAM
BLACSTONE, COMMENTAmES *38-41 (discussing first principles of the law of nature).
174 See, e.g., RONALD DWORIuN, TAXING RIGHTS SERIOUsLY 16 (1977) (stating positivism
is accepted "by most working and academic lawyers who hold views on jurisprudence.");
JOSEPH VINING, THE AUTHoRrrATIVE AND THE AuTHoRrAIuAN 17 (1986) ("[L]awyers today
all act as... positivists from time to time, and with some conviction"); David Millon, Positiv-
ism in the Historiography of the Common Law,- 1989 Wis. L. REV. 669, 670 n.3 ("[P] ositivism
remains the dominant way of thinking about what law is and ought to be in the United
States as well as in Great Britain.").
175 STONE, supra note 148, at 17-18; Roberto Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51
AM.J. INT'L L. 691, 700-07 (1957); see also HART, supra note 158, at 3-4 (describing interna-
tional law as a "doubtful case( ]" of law).
176 AUSTIN, supra note 171, at 148.
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A nascent commitment to positivism helps explain why judges
often accord international law only that level of effectiveness that the
Constitution and congressional statutes indisputably require.' 77 It
also helps explain particular elements of doctrinal provincialism:
first, the judicial reluctance to find the existence of customary law or
general principles of law, neither of which fits neatly into the positivist
paradigm of authoritative governmental pronouncement; and second,
the judicial inclination to treat congressional acts-authoritative pro-
nouncements of the state-as superior to any form of international
law. Turning to cases, a nascent commitment to positivism helps ex-
plain Alvarez-Machain's concentration on treaty law to the virtual ex-
clusion of custom.'78 Likewise, such a commitment to positivism
helps explain the Court's failure even to acknowledge the customary
law of prescriptive jurisdiction in Aramco and Hartford, or the custom-
ary law of refugees in Sale.' 79 For the positivist, treaties count more
than custom. 8 0
But positivism is riddled with problems. It has come under in-
creasing attack throughout this century from many different
quarters.' 8 ' There have been calls to reject it in favor of a revitalized
theory of natural law,'82 which positivism was thought to replace, or to
reject it in favor of still newer theories of law.183 Even more signifi-
177 Treaties fare best in U.S. law because the Constitution specifically makes them the
"supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Customary rules reliably form a
basis for U.S. decision-making only when Congress invites the practice, as it does, for exam-
ple, in the Alien Tort Statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988); see, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980).
178 See supra part IIA
179 See supra part II.B.
180 The commitment to positivism also explains, in all four cases, the Court's almost
fanatical devotion to its own case law: its consistent practice of citing its own cases even in
support of international legal propositions. This reflects a positivist viewpoint: Supreme
Court decisions issue from an authoritative organ of a government, whereas the traditional
sources of international law do not.
181 See, e.g., RONALD DWOIutN, LAW's EMPIRE 31-44 (1986); SAMUEL I. SHUMAN, LEGAL
PosrrmwsM: ITS SCOPE AND LIMrrATIONS 27 (1963) (describing legal positivism as "afflicted
with [an] ... incompleteness or inadequacy"); Henry Mather, Legal Positivism and American
Case Law, 38 U. FlA. L. REV. 615, 615-16 (1986) (arguing that "contemporary positivism is
incompatible with the realities of American case law."); Reginald Parker, Legal Positivism,
32 NoTRE DAME LAw. 31, 34-42 (1956-57). Positivists themselves have criticized and modi-
fied Austin's "sovereign command" version of the theory. See generally, e.g, H.LA HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994) (containing the preeminent analysis and qualification
of Austinian positivism).
182 E.g., JOHN FiNNiS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980); see also Robert P.
George, Recent Criticism of Natural Law Theory, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1988); Heidi M.
Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justifie, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2203, 2222-23 (1992) (utilizing a
natural law perspective).
183 Recent strands of thought include critical legal studies, law and economics, femi-
nistjurisprudence, and critical race theory. See generally EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF
LAW 539-686 (1994) (giving representative samples of writings in each of these traditions).
Some of these traditions give an entirely different answer to the question "What is Law?".
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cantly, a common ground of attack has been the observation that
there is more (or less) to law than the command of a sovereign, more
(or less) to law than the authoritative pronouncements of state or-
gans. 184 In other words, critics have called into question the very as-
pect of positivism most damaging to international law.185
Furthermore, even if some version of positivism is accepted as an
adequate account of domestic law, this does not mean that positivism
adequately describes other systems of law. That which fruitfully de-
scribes domestic law need not fruitfully describe international law.
Once this connection is broken, the positivistic attack on international
law is exposed as the banal observation that international law is not
the same as national law. The positivistic attack on international law is
compelling only if we assume that national law is the paradigm in
terms of which all other systems of law must be understood. But it is
not clear why this should be so. We might just as easily assume, for
example, that international law is the paradigm for "law" and con-
clude that domestic law is not "law" at all, but something else. If this
seems like word-play and the conclusion seems ludicrous, it is equally
a matter of word-play, and equally ludicrous, to claim that interna-
tional law is not "law" because it does not work like domestic legal
systems.186
b. Black-Box Theory
Doctrinal provincialism is also driven by an idea that can be de-
scribed as the "black-box" theory of international legal obligation.
This theory conceives international law as imposing its obligations
only on each state as a whole, and not on any of its constituent organs.
Others appear to make the answer irrelevant or much less interesting. For the effect of
these new theories on international law, see, for example, Hilary Charlesworth et al., Femi-
nist Approaches to International Law, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991); David Kennedy, A New
Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1 (1988) (analyzing public interna-
tional law); Fernando R. Teson, Feminism and International Law: A Reply, 33 VA.J. INT'L L.
647 (1993) (critiquing international law from a liberal and feminist perspective).
184 H.LA. Hart argues that Austinian theory does not, among other things, adequately
account for several types of law. HART, supra note 158, at 18-49. Ronald Dworkin argues
that even Hart's more sophisticated version of positivism still focuses too exclusively on law
as rules and fails, therefore, to account for the meaningful expression and application of
principles by judges and lawyers. DWORMN, supra note 174, at 14-80.
185 It is significant that Hart's version of positivism, shorn of the "sovereign command"
theory of law, is much kinder to international law. HART, supra note 158, at 211-31.
186 See, e.g., Glanville L. Williams, International Law and the Controversy Concerning the
Word "Law, "22 BaRr. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1945); see also Roger Fisher, BringingLaw to Bear on
Governments, 74 HARv. L. RE.v. 1130-31 (1961) (questioning a definition of law as'superior
force and suggesting a method for strengthening the role of international law); Gidon
Gottlieb, The Nature of International Law: Toward a Second Concept of Law, in 4 THE FtrruRE
oF THE INTERNATiONAL LEGAL ORDER 331 (Cyril E. Black & Richard A. Falk eds., 1972)
(arguing for a concept of law that acknowledges horizontal systems and that thus accounts
for international law).
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It is a matter for each state to determine which of its organs shall
execute the nation's international responsibilities, and each of those
organs, consequently, must await an internal signal to operate. For
judges, this means that international law has no independent author-
ity in the courtroom.
Black-box theory made an early appearance in American jurispru-
dence and has remained a common feature of judicial reasoning to
this day. In 1829, for example, when Chief Justice Marshall intro-
duced the distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties, he began with the observation that:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legisla-
tive act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be ac-
complished; especially so far as its operation is infta-territoria4 but is
carried into execution by the sovereign power of the respective par-
ties to the instrument.'8 7
And so the situation might have stood, had it not been for the U.S.
Constitution:
In the United States a different principle is established. Our Consti-
tution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently,
to be regarded in Courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the
legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any legis-
lative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a con-
tract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act,
the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial depart-
ment; and the legislature must execute the contract before it can
become a rule for the Court. 188
It is the Constitution that requires a different (and "unnatural") or-
dering of the relation between international and domestic law. But
the Constitution can only work its magic in certain situations: even if
a treaty is equated with legislation, it cannot really operate as legisla-
tion unless it looks like legislation. Unless a treaty looks like legisla-
tion, it reverts to its natural status of unenforceability in domestic
courts. 18 9
The black-box theory of international obligation also lies behind
several other elements of doctrinal provincialism: the rules that Con-
gressional legislation supersedes prior treaty provisions and customary
law, and the rule that executive action supersedes prior customary
187 Foster & Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313-314 (1829) (emphasis added).
188 Id. at 314.
189 Professor Paust reads Marshall's analysis differently, arguing that Marshall would
find all treaties capable of direct judicial enforcement unless the treaty itself explicitly con-
templates further domestic legislation. Jordan J. Paust, Sef-Executing Treaties, 82 Am. J.
INT'L L. 760, 767-68 (1988). I find this reading difficult to square with Marshall's remarks
that a treaty is not "in its nature" a legislative act, and that it "does not generally effect, of
itself, the object to be accomplished." Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 313 (emphasis added).
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law.190 At first blush, the "last-in-time" principle' 91 justifies these
rules, but it is the black-box theory that ultimately sustains them.
Each rule acknowledges that the political branches properly limit a
court's ability to enforce international law. The black-box theory, in
turn, makes that limitation plausible. To see the connection, consider
an alternative view of international obligations: suppose such obliga-
tions apply not only to the state as a whole, but to each organ of the
state.' 92 On such a view, the President and the Congress would be
obliged to act within the confines of international law and, corre-
spondingly, the courts would be under no obligation to give effect to
their acts contravening that law. On such an alternative view, the no-
tion that presidential or congressional action can override treaty and
customary rules becomes much harder, if not impossible, tojustify. In
short, the black-box theory helps to explain how an American court of
law can knowingly violate "our law," or countenance violations of "our
law" by the President and Congress.
But domestic reliance on black-box theory is flawed for two rea-
sons. First, the theory itself simply has begun to crumble under the
weight of contrary evidence. With increasing frequency since World
War II, international law has reached inside state boundaries to make
individuals the holders of rights and the bearers of responsibilities. 193
It has reached inside the state to require that legislatures act, that ex-
ecutives prosecute, and that courts try.' 94 It is no longer tenable to
190 See supra notes 31, 34, 35 and accompanying text.
191 See infra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
192 Professor Paust argues persuasively that this alternative view was in fact the "origi-
nal understanding," at least regarding treaties. Paust, supra note 189, at 760-66.
193 The growth of international human rights law bears witness to the proposition that
individuals increasingly hold rights under international law. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD (1990) (discussing the rights of individuals and
peoples in the context of the international community); DAVID P. FORSYrHE, THE INTERNA-
TIONALIZATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS (1991) (analyzing and documenting the growth of inter-
national human rights); HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Thedor Meron ed., 1984)
(discussing global and regional protection of human rights); Louis B. Sohn, The New Inter-
national Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 Am. U. L. REv. 1
(1982) (exploring various human rights protected by international law). At the same time,
individuals are increasingly understood to be the bearers of responsibility under interna-
tional law. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, S. TREATY Doc. No. 1, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., art. IUI-lV, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (regis-
tered Jan. 12, 1951) (criminalizing genocide and related offenses); International L.
Comm'n, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 30 IL.M. 1584, 1584-
1593 (1991); see generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1986)
(discussing all aspects of international criminal law including penalties for individual
breaches of international law).
194 This results especially from human rights and anti-terrorism conventions. See, e.g.,
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 193,
at 277, art. V-VI (directing ratifying states to undertake domestic legislation and to try
those charged with genocide); United Nations, Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1028 (1984) (obliging states to "take effective
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maintain that international law is "in its nature" a state-to-state affair,
or that it is fundamentally incapable of peering inside the black-box of
the state.' 95
Second, whatever its current state of decline, black-box theory
represents the international community's position on the nature of inter-
national legal obligation, not necessarily the position properly taken
by individual states, including the United States. Black-box theory
makes a great deal of sense, from a global perspective, because it rec-
ognizes both the fact and legitimacy of states having organized them-
selves in different ways. It would be an unwarranted interference in
domestic affairs, as well as impractical, to require that specific institu-
tions carry out international obligations. But when one moves from a
global view to -a domestic view, the analysis changes radically. The
United States has organized itself in a manner that suggests the do-
mestic application of black-box theory is inappropriate. The United
States has exalted the rule of law and has made its courts the final
arbiters of that law. In such a context, one cannot treat it as a matter
of indifference (as might the international community) whether the
nation's political branches should be bound to act in accordance with
international law, or whether the courts should play a leading role as
that law's final arbiters. Black box theory is plausible internationally,
but far less so domestically.
2. The Quasi-Constitutional Sources
Taken together, legal positivism and the black-box theory of in-
ternational legal obligation go a long way toward explaining the deep-
est foundations of doctrinal provincialism in U.S. courts. From the
courts' perspective, however, the more immediate concern is the Con-
stitution and what it says about the proper relation between domestic
and international law.
Actually, the Constitution says very little. The only direct state-
ment comes from Article VI:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures" to prevent torture); GA Res. 146,
United Nations, International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. GAOR 6th
Comm., 34th Sess., Agenda Item 113, at art. 2-6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23 (1979), reprinted
in 18 I.L.M. 1456, 1456-1459 (1979) (requiring states to legislate, investigate, and prose-
cute hostage-takers).
195 Professors Schwarzenberger and Brown aptly summarize the general situation:
"The rules governing recognition [of international personality] are so elastic that there is
no limit to the objects which, by recognition, may be transformed into subjects of interna-
tional law." GEORG SC-VARZENBERGER & E.D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64
(6th ed. 1976).
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supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notvithstanding.196
This requires only that treaties override state law. It does not specify
how treaties fare against the Constitution and congressional statutes
or how other sources of international law relate to domestic law. The
courts, of course, have filled in the gaps and, in doing so, have often
perceived themselves as performing constitutional analysis. Such a
characterization may not be harmful, so long as one remembers that:
(i) whatever it is that the courts are analyzing, it is not the constitu-
tional text;197 and (ii) theories of American government, founded not
on the explicit text of the Constitution, but on structure, history, and
policy, are subject to counter-arguments based on the same extrinsic
sources.198
What the courts have developed, in the face of textual silence, is a
quasi-constitutional theory of American government characterized by
the desire to maintain separate spheres of authority among the coor-
dinate branches of the federal government. These "separation of
powers" concerns have generated principles of deference to the Con-
gress and the President that have inhibited the courts' ability to apply
international law. Such deference clearly lies both behind the rules
that congressional action supersedes prior international treaties and
international customary law, and the suggestion that executive action
supersedes earlier custom. 199 In these circumstances, courts will en-
force a violation of intemational law because another branch of gov-
ernment caused it. In addition, deference to the Congress and the
President lies behind the rule that U.S. courts will not apply treaties
and customary law unless they are self-executing. 20 0 In this situation,
courts defer because they believe themselves unable to apply interna-
tional law unless Congress enacts implementing legislation.20 1
But what in the structure of American government requires judi-
cial deference to the other branches? Two primary theories exist.
196 U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2.
197 Cf. Henkin, supra note 31, at 1562-63 & n.31 (1984) (noting that the language of
the Constitution does not require certain judicial doctrines that disfavor international
law).
198 See, e.g., FRucI<, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 8, at 31-60; Louis L. JAFFE, JUDI-
CIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 12-41 (1933); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Ques-
tion" Doctrine., 85 YALE LJ. 597, 622 (1976).
199 See supra notes 31, 34, 35 and accompanying text.
200 See supra notes 30, 33 and accompanying text.
201 This sort of deference, of course, also derives from the black-box theory of interna-
tional legal obligation. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
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a. Locus of the Sovereign Will
Courts in the United States often defer to the political branches,
especially to Congress, on the ground that those other branches,
rather than the courts, represent the locus of American sovereignty.
While talk of "sovereignty" is often loose (and sometimes dangerous),
if one takes the word to mean "ultimate political authority," the argu-
ment seems straightforward enough. If the political authority of the
nation lies ultimately with its people, those branches of government
elected by the people- Congress and the President-speak with
more authority than the unelected branch.
One sees this principle at work, for example, in Whitney v. Robert-
son.202 In that case, the Supreme Court sought support for the rule
that later statutes supersede prior treaties as the law to be applied in
U.S. courts. In Whitney, Justice Field wrote that "the duty of the courts
is to construe and give effect to the latest expression of the sovereign
will."2 0 3 He presumed that the legislature is the proper locus of "the
sovereign will" and that, when the sovereign changes its mind, the
courts are obliged to follow.2 0 4
An even clearer and more detailed use of the principle appears in
the Head Money Cases.205 In that case Justice Miller considered the
possible justifications for the opposite rule, which would place trea-
ties, categorically, above congressional legislation.
The Constitution gives [a treaty] no superiority over an act of Con-
gress .... Nor is there anything in its essential character, or in the
branches of the government by which the treaty is made, which gives it this
superior sanctity.
A treaty is made by the President and the Senate. Statutes are
made by the President, the Senate and the House of Representa-
tives. The addition of the latter body to the other two in making a
law certainly does not render it less entitled to respect in the matter
of its repeal or modification than a treaty made by the other two. If
there be any difference in this regard, it would seem to be in favor
of an act in which all three of the bodies participate. 20 6
In short, the source of law that engages the greatest number of our
elected institutions is the one most entitled to judicial deference.
202 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
203 1d. at 195.
204 See also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (holding that an
exercise of legislative power to keep Chinese laborers out of the United States superseded
any treaty between the United States and China); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United
States Sovereignty: A entury of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HAv. L. RFv. 853, 854
(1987) (concluding that the judiciary abdicates its responsibility in failing to prevent the
executive from breaching international obligations).
205 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
206 let at 599 (emphasis added).
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But judicial deference to Congress or the President, on the
ground that the elected branches of government more directly en-
gage the people's-and thus the nation's-sovereign will, is unduly
simplistic and does not account for the ways in which we actually dis-
tribute legal authority. There is no simple correlation between the
method by which a decision-maker is selected and the legal authority
of that decision-maker. Many state judges, for example, are elected
directly by the citizens of the state in which they serve, but they do
not, for this reason, have the power to overturn the actions of ap-
pointed state officials. Collectively, state governments are just as
electorally well connected to the people as the federal government,
but this does not lead us to conclude that they may countermand ear-
lier federal law.2 0 7 And most dramatically of all, the appointive status
of federal judges has not prevented us from accepting their assertion
of the power to overturn the work of popularly elected legislatures
and executives, both federal and state, on the ground that these asser-
tions of "the people's will" are unconstitutional. 208
Ties to the electorate are important, but often not decisive, in
settling questions of relative legal authority. Other principles-turn-
ing on concerns of constitutionalism and the proper roles of different
governmental actors-come into play. And once a court accepts (as it
must) the propriety of resorting to "non-electoral" principles in sort-
ing out questions of authority, it cannot defer to the elected branches
simply because they are elected. The courts must dig deeper than
"sovereign will" analysis.
A return to the work of Justice Miller in the Head Money Cases209
reveals the fruitfulness of digging deeper. As he sought to determine
whether later congressional acts should supersede earlier treaty obli-
gations as the law of the United States, Justice Miller's "sovereign will"
analysis led him to conclude that there was nothing "in the branches
of government by which the treaty is made, which gives it ... superior
sanctity."210 Indeed, he found a slight reason for preferring congres-
sional acts, since they involve the concurrence of the President, Sen-
ate, and House, while treaties only require consent by the President
and Senate.21' Tellingly, however, Justice Miller did not rest his con-
207 Of course such a conclusion would contravene the Supremacy Clause. See e.g.,
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (discussing state court responsibility under
Supremacy Clause).
208 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Acceptance ofjudicial review
does not, of course, mean "acceptance without controversy." See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMER-
ICAN CONSTIUTNONAL LAW 23-66 (2d ed. 1988) (canvassingjudicial and scholarly reaction
to judicial review).
209 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
210 Id. at 599.
211 Id.
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clusion on "electoral analysis," but turned instead to another princi-
ple: the electoral authority of congressional acts and treaties being of
roughly equal soundness, he concluded that the principle of "last-in-
time" should govern.2 12 He himself recognized the limits of sovereign
will analysis and turned to another principle.
Once the relevance of other principles is recognized, there is no
good reason, a priori, to stop at "last-in-time." In the Head Money ques-
tion, for example, Justice Miller might have noted that a preference
for later congressional acts, because it puts the United States in viola-
tion of prior international obligations, engages the nation's legal lia-
bility for reparations or damages, and that a preference for earlier
treaties does not. Based on a principle of "relative legal liability," Jus-
tice Miller could have sensibly concluded, and we might conclude to-
day, that treaty law supersedes even later congressional acts.213 In any
event, we can surely agree with Justice Miller that courts ought not
defer to the President or Congress solely on the ground that they are
the proper repositories of the sovereign will.
b. Locus of Foreign Affairs Power
Sovereign will analysis often leads courts to defer to Congress.
Judicial deference to the President is, however, more likely based on
the President's perceived role in foreign affairs. The President's pre-
eminence in foreign affairs derives its cogency from two different lines
of argument. The first is constitutional and is grounded in a particu-
lar reading of the Constitution that places "foreign affairs" in the Pres-
ident's hands.2 14 The second is practical and is drawn primarily from
reflections about the necessities of any government, however organ-
ized: courts defer to the President because nations need a single voice
in foreign affairs and the executive branch is the branch best organ-
ized to provide that single voice.2 15
But as a ground for doctrinal provincialism, judicial deference to
the President in foreign affairs is dubious. First, the Constitution
212 Id
213 See, e.g., Henkin, supra note 204, at 870-71 (noting, among other things, that "trea-
ties may indeed have superior sanctity.because of their essential character as international
obligations.").
214 E.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (ruling President exclusively
responsible for conduct of diplomatic and foreign affairs); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635, 696-97 (1862) (stating that President conducts foreign relations of
government).
215 E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (stating that many questions of foreign
relations uniquely demand a single-voiced statement of the government's views); Doe v.
Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (arguing that it would be impossible for the
executive to conduct foreign relations if every court in the country had the authority to
decide whether the person who ratified a treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had such
power to ratify).
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makes no mention of a "foreign affairs power," much less places it
with the President. Instead, the Constitution gives specific "foreign
affairs" powers to each branch of government: to the President, it
grants the command of the armed forces and the power to appoint
and receive ambassadors;216 to the Congress, it gives the power to de-
clare war, regulate foreign trade, and set tariffs;2 17 and to the
Supreme Court, it grants the power to hear cases affecting Ambassa-
dors and other foreign officials.218 Since foreign affairs competence is
divided among all three branches, one should not conceive the Presi-
dent's control of foreign affairs as exclusive, even if one acknowledges
the President's primacy in those matters.219
Second, even acknowledging the President's preeminent role in
foreign affairs, one may properly question the extent to which that
role should influence U.S. judicial treatment of international law.
There is nothing inconsistent in thinking that foreign affairs policy
belongs in the executive branch and international law in the judicial
branch.220 Though clearly related, foreign affairs policy and interna-
tional law are distinct areas of endeavor, just as domestic policy and
domestic law are legitimately subject to division between the political
branches and the courts.
Likewise, deference to the President on the "one-voice" theory-
the notion, that is, that the nation needs to speak with one voice, that
of the President-would be more convincing but for two facts: (1) it
is not clear that nations need to speak with one voice in order to sur-
vive, or even to prosper, in international relations; 221 and (2) because
of congressional prerogatives, our nation often speaks with at least two
voices anyway. 222
3. The International Sources
Two elements of doctrinal provincialism appear to find their justi-
fication not in jurisprudential theories of law or quasi-constitutional
216 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, 2, § S.
217 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3, 11.
218 Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. The federal courts as a whole are given even wider responsibil-
ities in international affairs. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power to all cases
involving treaties, admiralty and maritime claims, and suits between U.S. and foreign
citizens).
219 SeeArthur Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs: The Intent of the
Constitution Historically Examined, 5 SETON HAu. L. REv. 527, 537-40 (1974) (arguing foun-
ders did not intend foreign policy to be the prerogative of any one branch).
220 See, e.g., FR.ANCK, PoLrrICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 8, at 5-6 (distinguishing foreign
policy from judicial policy); HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 15, at 205-24 (describing
legitimate role of courts in matters involving international relations).
221 On the experience of post-war Germany, for example, see FRaNcK, POLITICAL QUES-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 107-25.
222 See, e.g., TnoMAs M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 13
(1979); HENMN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 15, at 89-123; TRIBE, supra note 208, at 219-25.
[Vol. 81:4
PRO VINCLALISM
theories of American government, but, ironically, in the theory and
practice of international law itself. More specifically, the reluctance of
U.S. courts to find the existence of an international custom, or to find
the existence of a general principle of law, echoes a similar reluctance
in the practice of international courts.
International custom is hard to establish. It requires a consistent
pattern of behavior by nation-states and a belief by those states that
such behavior is legally required.223 The classic case of the S.S. Lo-
tus,224 decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice in
1927, demonstrates how difficult it can be to convince even an inter-
national court that a custom exists. In Lotus, the French government
objected to the Turkish trial of a French seaman following a collision
of French and Turkish vessels on the high seas.225 The French sought
to establish rules of customary law that would bar such a trial, but
failed, in three successive attempts to convince the Court that the pro-
posed rules did in fact exist.226 On a more abstract level, before and
after Lotus, the very nature of international custom, and the theory by
which it binds states, have been matters of controversy. 227
General principles of law, likewise, are sometimes difficult to es-
tablish. Even the International Court of Justice, whose founding stat-
ute explicitly makes general principles of law a primary source of
international law,228 has been "distinctly, and perhaps understanda-
bly, conservative" 229 in its use of such principles. It is fairly common
for scholars and judges to relegate general principles of law to "filling
in the gaps" left by treaty and custom.23 0
223 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 102 (2) cmts. b, c (stating custom results from a
general and consistent practice of states, acting out of a sense of legal obligation);
ANTHoNYA D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 47-72 (1971) (sum-
marizing traditional views on the elements of custom); KAROL WOLV, , CUSTOM IN PRESENT
INTERNATIONAL .AW 40-51 (2d rev. ed. 1993) (summarizing elements of custom from the
practice of the International Court ofJustice and the International Law Commission).
224 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 4 (Sept. 7).
225 1& at 5-6.
226 Id. at 22-31.
227 See, e.g., D'AMATO, supra note 223, at 47-102, 169-229 (presenting scholarly and judi-
cial arguments about the elements of custom and its binding force); WoLux, supra note
223, at 1-44, 160-68 (same).
228 ICJ Statute, supra note 29, art. 38(1)(c).
229 C. WILFRED JENKS, THE PROSPECS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 305 (1964); see
also Schrader, supra note 36, at 769 (describing international courts as conservative in their
application of general principles).
230 E.g., Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972
I.C.J. 46, 109 (Aug. 18) (separate opinion ofJudge Dillard) (stating general principles act
as aids in establishing custom or the implied terms of treaties); RESTATEMENT, supra note
14, § 102(4) (describing general principles as "supplementary rules" that may be impor-
tant when no custom or treaty applies);JJANIs, supra note 32, at 54-58 (describing general
principles as "gap fillers").
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U.S. courts-in their reluctance to find the existence of custom
and general principles of law-seem merely to have adopted a prac-
tice of caution shared by their international counterparts. But this
appearance is misleading. Although cautionary in their approach, in-
ternational tribunals habitually invoke custom and general principles
of law in their judgments. 231 This is hardly surprising, since custom
continues to dominate many areas of international law,232 and since
international law still has many "gaps" left to be filled by general
principles. 233
Seen in this light, U.S. courts have pushed caution to an ex-
treme.234 For example, the Supreme Court has not explicitly recog-
nized the existence of a custom in almost 100 years.235 Lower federal
courts have made such holdings on occasion, 236 but a handful of cases
in a century's worth of litigation bespeaks a level of caution better
described as full retreat.237 General principles of law have fared no
better.23 8 Despite their caution, international tribunals regularly find
231 See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW: As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS
AND TRIBUNALS 387-99 (1953) (formulating a draft code of international principles that
international courts and tribunals apply);JENKS, supra note 229, at 266-315 (reviewing gen-
eral principles that international tribunals utilize); H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAw SOURCES
AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 60-62 (1927) (noting that agreements between gov-
ernments direct international courts and tribunals, in almost all cases, to apply general
principles of some sort); WoLFE, supra note 223, at 116-59 (reviewing international judi-
cial practice in ascertaining custom); Rudolph Bernhardt, Customary International Law, in 7
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (1984) (presenting a short survey of the
theory and application of customary law); Hermann Mosler, General Principles of Law, in 7
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 89 (1984) (describing general principles that
judicial tribunals invoke).
232 See WOLFKE, supra note 223, at xiii.
233 See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49 (1991).
234 Cf Schrader, supra note 36, at 757 (observing that U.S. courts "have traditionally
been more conservative than international bodies in deriving rules of law from such
sources as custom and general principles").
235 Research for this Article indicates that the last such case was The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677 (1900).
236 E.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that state-
sponsored torture violates international customary law); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F.
Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that "causing disappearances" is an international
tort established by custom); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980)
(holding that indeterminate detention of an alien implicates customary law), affd on other
grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
237 See Trimble, Revisionist View, supra note 8, at 684-707 (documenting the infrequent
use of customary law in American courts). Courts in the United States have often made
reference to customary law, assuming it exists for the purpose of argument or using it to
help construe congressional legislation. See, e.g., Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of Interna-
tional Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1135-62
(1990) (collecting cases and describing historical development of international law's use as
interpretive aid). But these uses differ categorically from an explicit determination that a
rule of customary law does exist, and a determination of its precise content.
238 See Schrader, supra note 36, at 769-79 (discussing recent judicial references to "gen-
eral" or "universally accepted" principles). None of the opinions the Schrader Note de-
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and apply both custom and general principles; the virtual refusal of
American courts to find such law at all cannot reasonably be justified
as merely echoing the international approach.2 39
4. The Prognosis for Change
Doctrinal provincialism is not so easily condemned as its method-
ological sibling. Although its potential harms are greater-to liti-
gants, to the courts, to the United States, and to international law-it
is founded on grounds more laudable than ignorance. This is not to
say, however, that they are good grounds, or good enough to justify
the harms.
Opinions are likely to vary on the current vigor of positivism and
the black-box theory of international legal obligation, but support for
these theories is clearly declining. As these theories erode, the philo-
sophical bases of doctrinal provincialism erode with them. Opinions
will also vary on the strength of the quasi-constitutional theories of
American government that push U.S. courts to eschew the application
of international law in deference to the work of the political branches.
But these theories, too, are debatable and the constitutional text
clearly does not require them. All of this suggests that doctrinal pro-
vincialism, while not to be condemned categorically, ought to be sub-
jected to a searching, element-by-element review.
Change will be difficult. Each element of doctrinal provincialism
is grounded not only in the deeper philosophical and constitutional
considerations discussed here, but more immediately in precedent.
Some elements are more firmly entrenched in precedent than others,
but all have judicial decisions, sometimes Supreme Court decisions,
supporting them.2 40 Change will necessarily require a firm conviction
that the old ways were wrong or, at least, that they warrant serious
reexamination. The strength of recent criticism suggests that some
elements of doctrinal provincialism ought to be jettisoned and others
modified.2 41
scribes explicitly derived a rule of international, as opposed to domestic, law from a
general principle of law.
239 But c.f Schrader, supra note 36, at 762-68, 770-82 (reviewing and criticizing recent
uses of customary law and general principles of law in American decisions); Trimble, Revi-
sionist Tiew, supra note 8, at 678-84, 707-31 (questioning the legitimacy and wisdom of do-
mestic judicial use of customary international law). Those who doubt the legitimacy or
wisdom of invoking custom and general principles in U.S. courts are understandably less
concerned about judicial failures to find the existence of such rules in the first place.
240 See supra notes 30-36.
241 On the self-executing treaties doctrine, see, for example, Yuji Iwasawa, The Doctrine
of Self-Executing Treaties in the United States: A Critical Analysis, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 627 (1986);
Faust, supra note 189. On the last-in-time doctrine, see, for example, Henkin, Chinese Ex-
clusion, supra note 204, at 870-78 (1987); Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Be-
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C. Jurisdictional Provincialism
Jurisdictional provincialism-the tendency of U.S. courts to ex-
clude international cases from the domestic docket-is the most chal-
lenging of provincialism's three forms to assess. As we have already
seen, its harms-to litigants, to the United States, and to international
law-are more contingent than those of provincialism's other forms,
because not every international case excluded from the American
docket necessarily involves international law. Those things that make
a case "international"-the existence, for example, of parties, evi-
dence, or events with different national links-increase the likeli-
hood, but do not assure, that international law is germane. And if it is
not, then ajudicial refusal to hear such a case causes no harm to inter-
national law or the interests of the international community.
Many international cases, however, do involve international law.
The refusal to hear such cases risks injustice to litigants with claims
well-founded in that law, risks harm to the United States if the courts'
refusal to hear such cases permits on-going U.S. violations of interna-
tional law, and harms international law, which goes unvindicated.
Whether international law is involved or not, a denial of a hearing
always risks injustice (if, for example, no other forum is available) and
always causes a delay in justice. Such harms should not be counte-
nanced unless otherwise justified.
What, then, are the grounds of'jurisdictional provincialism? Un-
like doctrinal and methodological provincialism, jurisdictional provin-
cialism grows out of neither ignorance nor a concern for the proper
role of international law. Rather, it grows out of a concem for the
proper role of the courts themselves. It grows from the conviction
that courts ought not to hear every case presented to them for
decision.
Generally speaking, courts reject cases for three sorts of reasons.
First, a case must be well-suited to judicial resolution. If there are no
opposing parties with real interests currently at stake, or if the parties
seek or need a kind of relief that courts cannot easily provide, judicial
resolution is inappropriate. Such considerations have generated the
requirement of standing,242 as well as the doctrines of mootness 243
tween Congressional Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the
Primacy of Custom, 28 VA.J. INT'L L. 393 (1988).
242 E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
731-32 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 85 (1968).
243 E.g., SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 407 (1972); Hall v.
Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969) (per curiam); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 495-97
(1969).
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and ripeness, 244 and the judicial aversion to advisory opinions.245 Sec-
ond, assuming a case is well-suited to judicial resolution, a court may
refrain from deciding on grounds of fairness, believing, for example,
that a particular proceeding burdens the litigants with a process they
had no legitimate reason to expect, or with one held in a place that is
needlessly inconvenient. These considerations have generated rules
of personal jurisdiction 246 and the defense of forum non con-
veniens.247 Third, even if a cause is susceptible to judicial resolution
and the particular proceedings are likely to be fair to the parties, a
court may still refrain from deciding because it believes that some
other court, or some other institution entirely, is more appropriate.
This deference to other decision-makers lies behind most of the ele-
ments of jurisdictional provincialism and warrants further analysis.
Sometimes a court defers to other courts within its own national
system by refusing to hear a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdic-
tion 248 or staying a case currently pending in another court under the
lis alibi pendens doctrine.249 Sometimes a court defers instead to the
other branches of government by refusing to hear a case that raises a
"political question."5 0 And sometimes a court defers to authorities in
other nations by providing immunity to a foreign sovereign 25' or by
244 E.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1983); Abbot Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
245 E.g., United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961); Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.(a) (1792).
246 E.g., Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1990) (statingjurisdic-
tion over non-consenting, out-of-forum defendant turns on traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice); see also Helicopteros Nacionaes de Colom. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984) (determining foreign corporation's contacts with the State of Texas insufficient to
support in personam jurisdiction); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
316 (1945) (ruling that minimum contacts with the forum state are needed in order to
subject a defendant to an in personam judgment).
247 E.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (ruling dismissal appro-
priate when plaintiff's chosen forum is oppressive or vexatious to defendant and an alter-
native forum exists); see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947)
(discussing the interests a court should take into account when deciding whether to dis-
miss based upon a claim of forum non conveniens).
248 E.g., Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Xroger, 437 U.S. 365,377 (1978) (determining
that wrongful death claim between two Iowa litigants is a matter for adjudication in state
forum).
249 E.g., Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 184 (1952) (up-
holding stay of federal action in Delaware so that federal action in Illinois could proceed);
Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 253 (1936) (setting out principles for determining
propriety of staying action in one court in deference to actions in another); see generally
Propriety of Staying Action or Proceeding Pending Another Action or Proceeding, 81 L.
Ed. 161 annot. (1937) (discussing scope of lis alibi pendens doctrine).
250 E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-17 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
1, 46 (1849).
251 E.g., Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 576 (1926); United States v.
Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 524 (1875); The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
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refusing to sit in judgment of a foreign nation's acts within its own
territory (the "act of state doctrine").252
This analysis suggests a straightforward correspondence between
the sorts of institutions deferred to-other domestic courts, other
branches of domestic government, and other nations-and the partic-
ular elements ofjurisdictional provincialism. The situation, however,
is more complex than that. It often happens that a particular form of
judicial self-abnegation is grounded on deference to more than one
decision-maker. The act of state doctrine, for example, is grounded
both on deference to foreign states and deference to the executive
branch of our domestic government (the courts believing thatjudicial
review of another nation's actions may interfere with the foreign rela-
tions prerogatives of the President).253 The lis alibi pendens doctrine,
to cite another example, usually involves deference to another court,
but if that court is in another country, deference to a foreign sover-
eign and its judicial process is also implicated.254
In sum, jurisdictional provincialism grows out of at least three
overlapping concerns: that the parties' dispute be amenable to judi-
cial resolution; that the parties be treated fairly; and that no other
decision-maker is better situated to handle the matter.255 The first
two concerns are less problematic than the third. It is undoubtedly
true that some disputes are not well-suited to judicial resolution. A
request for judgment, for example, that does not involve a conflict
between real adversaries, with real interests at stake, is likely to be han-
dled poorly by a court system whose rules and practices presume the
existence of such adversaries at every turn. Similarly, it is hard to
question, in principle, a court's concern with whether a particular
252 E.g., W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 402-04
(1990); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 400-01 (1964); Underhill v.
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
253 Compare Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (discussing sovereignty of states rationale) with
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 423, 426 (offering constitutional separation-of-powers
rationale).
254 E.g., Robinson v. Royal Bank of Can., 462 So. 2d 101, 102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(per curiam).
255 The immediate doctrinal sources of deference vary as well. Courts defer to others
based on the requirements of the Constitution, on congressional statutes, and on prior
judicial decisions. Judge-made rules of deference, in turn, are usually based on prudence.
Grounds for a particular doctrine can also vary over time. Foreign sovereign immunity, for
example, was historically based on the perceived requirements of international law and a
quasi-constitutional, separation-of-powers deference to the President in matters of foreign
affairs; today, a congressional statute clearly forms the basis for such immunity. Compare
National City Bank of N.Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955) (reviewing the inter-
national and national policies underlying the judge-made doctrine of foreign sovereign
immunity) withForeign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988) andH.R.
REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN. 6604, 6610-11
(FSIA to provide "sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sover-
eign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State courts.").
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proceeding would be unfair to one of the parties. Courts are particu-
larly concerned with fairness and one would expect them to abstain
from acting in ways that are unfair. But if a case is amenable to judi-
cial resolution and the particular proceeding would be fair to the par-
ties involved, it becomes harder tojustify abstention. If a court can do
a good job and do it fairly, then it properly defers to other institutions
only when that deference is clearly warranted.
Courts in the United States do, of course, work within a system of
governments, both domestic and foreign, and a sensitivity to "system"
concerns is certainly appropriate. But U.S. courts tend to go astray in
just this area, by overestimating the claims of other institutions as bet-
ter fora. This propensity is clearest in their deference to the political
branches and to the governments of other nations.2 56 Judicial defer-
ence to the political branches, as demonstrated earlier, derives pri-
marily from quasi-constitutional theories of American government not
required by the constitutional text.2 57 Likewise, judicial deference to
other nations is frequently overblown. Our courts uncritically defer to
the "prerogatives of foreign sovereigns" in cases in which interna-
tional law recognizes no such prerogatives or recognizes them in a
much more limited fashion than do our courts.258 This suggests that
the elements ofjurisdictional provincialism most in need of serious re-
examination are those that are founded primarily on deference to the
domestic political branches and to other nations, specifically, the
political question doctrine, foreign sovereign immunity, and the act of
state doctrine. Indeed, these particular elements ofjurisdictional pro-
256 See FRANcK, PoLrrcA. QUESTIONS, supra note 8, passim (presenting an extended,
well-reasoned attack on judicial deference to the political branches). In Franck's view, such
deference animates not only the political question doctrine, but the act of state doctrine
and the judicially-created rules of foreign sovereign immunity.
257 See supra part IV.B.2.
258 The act of state doctrine, for example, finds little support in international law.
International scholar Ian Brownlie says flatly that it "is not a rule of public international
law." BROWNLUE, supra note 14, at 507. The United States Supreme Court has itself recog-
nized that international law does not compel recognition of the doctrine. Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-23 (1964). The Restatement quite properly de-
scribes it as "Law of the United States." RESTATEmENT, supra note 14, § 443.
The Restatement describes the provision of foreign sovereign immunity, on the other
hand, as "an undisputed principle of customary international law." Id. at 390. Even so,
domestic courts have historically provided immunity to foreign sovereigns under circum-
stances that international law did not require: first, by maintaining a rule of "absolute"
immunity at a time when other states had begun to provide such immunity only on a more
restricted basis; and second, by deferring conclusively to executive branch determinations
of immunity when international law nowhere required such a practice. See Ex Pane Rep.
of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943); Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 571 (1926).
Congress forced change with the passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a) (2) (3) (4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1988).
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vincialism have tended to attract the most scathing criticism by inter-
national scholars. 259
The other elements of jurisdictional provincialism-personal ju-
risdiction requirements, subject-matter jurisdiction requirements,
standing requirements, the forum non conveniens doctrine, and the
lis alibi pendens doctrine-require scrutiny as well, although their ul-
timate reform will be harder to achieve. As previously noted, they
tend to derive from legitimate concerns about the limits of the judicial
function and the need for fairness.260 In addition, they have devel-
oped primarily in a domestic context and have "proven" themselves in
a broad range of (admittedly domestic) cases. It is unlikely, for this
reason, that courts will simply discard them. Consequently, the pro-
ponent of change must take the rhetorically difficult position of argu-
ing that an exception should be made, and that the effects of a
jurisdictional rule should be ameliorated, when international cases
arise. Moreover, rhetorical disadvantage aside, many of the remaining
elements ofjurisdictional provincialism are based on constitutional or
statutory provisions, which, at least from ajudge's perspective, places
them beyond effective criticism.26'
Despite these hurdles, the remaining elements of jurisdictional
provincialism ought to be examined and reformed. First, problems
often arise from the application of a doctrine rather than from the
doctrine itself or its underlying rationale. For example, the use of the
standing requirement most corrosive to international law derives not
so much from the requirement itself, but from its use as a vehicle for
259 On the political question doctrine, see, for example, Michael J. Glennon, Foreign
Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine 83 AM.J. INT'L L. 814 (1989); Louis Henkin, Lexical
Priority or "Political Question": A Response, 101 HARv. L. Rxv. 524 (1987); Henkin, supra note
15; Wayne McCormack, TheJusticiability Myth and the Concept of Law, 14 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 595 (1987). On the act of state doctrine, see, for example, MichaelJ. Bazyler, Abolish-
ing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. Rv. 325 (1986). Since the passage of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, scholarly attention has generally been drawn away from
the essential soundness of providing foreign sovereign immunity and defining its proper
limits, and has instead focused on the Act's application in the courts. The primary purpose
of this focus has been to bring order out of chaos. See, e.g., Mark B. Feldman, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity in United States Courts: 1976-1986, 19 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (1986);
see generally FRANca, POLITICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 8, passim (criticizingjudicial use of all
three doctrines).
260 See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
261 In federal practice, for example, only the forum non conveniens and lis alibi
pendens doctrines lack some direct foundation in the Constitution, congressional statute,
or federal rule. SeeBoiN & W=SrN, supra note 17, at 275, 320. The purely domestic use of
forum non conveniens now has a statutory foundation. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988). Both
the Constitution, U.S. CONs-. art. III, § 2, and federal statutes, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332
(1988) directly address subject matter jurisdiction. Federal rule, FED. R Civ. P. 4(k), and
constitutional requirements of due process, U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV, govern personal
jurisdiction. Although neither the Constitution, statute, nor rule explicitly require stand-
ing, it is grounded in the constitutional "case" or "controversy" requirement. U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2.
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applying the "black-box" theory of international legal obligation:262
its use in denying standing to individuals with international law claims
because those individuals "are not the subjects of international
law."263 A change in this particular application of standing doctrine
does not threaten either the requirement itself or the legitimate pol-
icy that underlies it. Likewise, personal jurisdiction requirements and
the forum non conveniens doctrine can be profitably analyzed to in-
sure that their application to international cases does not rely on simi-
larly misguided notions of legal theory or international law.2 64
Second, although most of these doctrines have "proven" them-
selves in a broad range of domestic cases, and any change to them
would likely come in the form of exceptions, such exceptions might
be justified for international cases. Simply put, the stakes are higher
when a court declines to hear an international case. When a court
declines to hear a domestic case, there is some assurance that another
domestic forum will be available. Domesticjurisdictional rules tend to
be developed with an eye toward the rules of other domestic jurisdic-
tions, and as a consequence, relatively few domestic cases "fall be-
tween the cracks."265 In international cases, however, the alternative
fora are more likely to be located in foreign states with which our own
domestic jurisdictional rules are not coordinated. Consequently, for
the international case, a denial ofjurisdiction in a U.S. court is more
likely to result in a denial of a hearing anywhere.2 66 If an alternative
forum is found, the change of forum is likely to be more convulsive
than in a domestic case, involving greatly increased travelling dis-
tances for at least one of the parties, a new language of adjudication,
and a very different set of procedures. Finally, because international
cases are more likely to involve international law, refusals to hear such
cases risk both harm to the United States, which may incur interna-
262 See supra notes 14 & 22 and accompanying text.
263 See supra note 22 (cases denying standing).
264 Courts can, at least, apply these doctrines with a view toward the special circum-
stances of international litigation. Since the personal jurisdiction of the federal courts now
essentially encompasses all that is constitutionally permissible, see FED. IL Civ. P.
4(k) (1) (A), (2), international rules ofjurisdiction to adjudicate can inform the due pro-
cess analysis in international cases. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 14, § 421 (definingjuris-
diction to adjudicate under international law). Forum non conveniens practice already
helps to minimize the danger that a U.S. court's refusal to hear a case will result in the case
not being heard at all by requiring that an alternative forum does, in fact, exist. See Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981) (stating dismissal on forum non conveniens
grounds generally inappropriate if alternative forum provides "clearly inadequate or unsat-
isfactory" remedy); see generally BoRN & WESTIN, supra note 17, at 312-16 (containing a
careful discussion and survey of cases on the alternative forum requirement).
265 The knowledge that one or more state courts will serve as alternative fora might,
for example, assuage worries about strict jurisdictional rules in the federal courts.
266 The forum non conveniens doctrine is the only element of jurisdictional provin-
cialism that takes explicit account of the availability of an alternative forum. See supra note
264.
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tional liability for a continued violation of that law, and harm to inter-
national law itself, which loses an opportunity for vindication. 267
There are no such risks when a U.S. court dismisses a purely domestic
case. These higher stakes, taken together, suggest that exceptions to
domestic jurisdictional rules are desirable in international cases.
Third, although many of these doctrines derive variously from
the Constitution, a statute, or a rule, and thus are immune from fron-
tal judicial attack, only subject matter jurisdiction (at least in the fed-
eral system) has a direct basis in both the U.S. Constitution and in
congressional statutes.268 Two other requirements-standing and
personal jurisdiction-have only an indirect basis in the Constitu-
tion,269 and the other doctrines have no constitutional or statutory
basis at all. In short, from ajudge's perspective, not all the elements
of jurisdictional provincialism are equally intransigent.
Finally, from a reformer's perspective, all the elements ofjurisdic-
tional provincialism require careful examination. One cannot study
the domestic treatment of international law for very long without get-
ting the clear impression that courts often use jurisdictional argu-
ments as pretexts, or at least adopt them uncritically, to avoid having
to deal with international law.2 70 For the reformer, advances made in
eradicating methodological and doctrinal provincialism will be lost if
courts still find easy refuge in jurisdictional refusals to hear interna-
tional cases at all.
V
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
American courts are more deeply and pervasively hostile to inter-
national law than is commonly acknowledged. The late William
Bishop's report to a generation of law students, that "American courts
frequently apply rules of international law,"'271 seems unnecessarily
bright.27 2 The evidence, in fact, runs the other way. The Supreme
Court's recent work-in Alvarez-Machain, Aramco, Hartford, and Sale-
illustrates the real status of international law in domestic decision-
267 See supra part III.B.1.
268 U.S. CONST. art. I1; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1988).
269 Id. art. III, § 2, amend. V, XIV (delineating the case or controversy requirement
from which developed the doctrine of standing and the due process clauses, which limit
the exercise of personal jurisdiction).
270 E.g., Bazyler, supra note 8, at 328 ("Courts use the [act of state] doctrine as an
excuse to avoid deciding difficult international transaction cases.").
271 WiLLIAM W. BISHOP, JR., INTERNATIONAL LAw 78 (3d ed. 1971); see also Brilmayer,
supra note 8, at 2285 ("American courts routinely enforce international claims of varying
shapes and sizes.").
272 Compare the more measured and more recent claim of Professors Carter and
Trimble, that "[s]ometimes U.S. courts will apply international law." BARRY E. CARTER &
PHILLIP K TriMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2d prtg. 1991).
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making273 and that status is clearly marginal. What, then, should be
done?
The first step is to recognize the depth and breadth of the phe-
nomenon. Professor Oscar Schachter has aptly described provincial-
ism as "our guild's dirty little secret, which we tend to cover up with
the best of intentions."27 4 However, a problem cannot be addressed
unless its existence is acknowledged. Those with the greatest interest
in promoting international law have the greatest interest in exposing
the full measure of its crippled domestic status.
The next step is to learn all we can about the phenomenon. As I
have argued throughout this Article, judicial animosity toward inter-
national law does not manifest itself as a large, undifferentiated mass
of rules and practices, but occurs in at least three distinct forms, each
with its own characteristic set ofjustifications and harms. I have also
tried to show the benefits of thinking about provincialism in this way.
What is most remarkable, I think, about these different forms is the
inverse symmetry between their wisdom and their amenability to
change. Methodological provincialism-the tendency to treat inter-
national cases as if they were domestic ones-is categorically bad and
the most amenable to change. Doctrinal provincialism-the tendency
to eschew international rules as rules of decision-although not cate-
gorically bad, is subject to element-by-element critique, and is less
amenable to change. Jurisdictional provincialism-the tendency to
dismiss cases with international implications-is least problematic cat-
egorically, and will be the most difficult to reform.
There is much work yet to be done. The constituent elements of
provincialism, the work-a-day rules and practices that present them-
selves to judges and lawyers, need serious, individual study. Some ele-
ments have already received such study.275 Others need such study for
the first time.276
The next step, which need not await the completion of a dozen
more studies, is to educate judges about international law. The most
enduring improvement would begin in law schools, with a required
course in international law. With such a requirement, the entire
bench (as well as those who appear before it) would eventually have a
273 See supra part II.
274 Letter from Oscar Schachter, Hamilton Fish Professor of International Law & Di-
plomacy Emeritus, Columbia University School of Law, to Patrick M. McFadden, Associate
Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law (June 17, 1994) (on file with
author).
275 See, e.g., supra notes 8, 241, 259 (citing such studies).
276 The ways and means of methodological provincialism have never received system-
atic study. Elements of the other forms of provincialism that seem most in need of a fresh,
systematic examination are the lis alibi pendens doctrine and the judicial reluctance to
find the existence of general principles of law. Cf Trimble, Revisionist View, supra note 8, at
732 (reporting on the reluctance of courts to find custom).
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minimal facility in international legal argument and a minimal sensi-
tivity to its possible applications.277 A universally required course in
international law would, of course, represent a sea-change in the stan-
dard law school curriculum, 2 78 but this requirement is neither unprec-
edented nor beyond rational hope of achievement. A few North
American law schools (in Quebec and Puerto Rico) 279 and almost all
European law schools currently require a course in international law
for their first degree. Indeed, at the beginning of this century, about
one-quarter of U.S. law schools required it as well.28 0 Those days
might return: the Section of International Law and Practice of the
American Bar Association has recently recommended (this time un-
successfully) that the multistate or individual state bar examinations
include international law questions.28' If such an effort ever succeeds,
curricular changes probably will follow.
Due regard for the real world, however, suggests that reformers
explore other avenues as well. Bar associations and others could offer
continuing legal education in international law to both lawyers and
judges, although an effort aimed at judges would be the most di-
rect.2 82 The American Society of International Law and the ABA's
Section on International Law and Practice are natural choices to lead
such an effort, as is the National Judicial College for the education of
statejudges.283 The federal judicial system and almost every state judi-
cial system hold conferences at least annually. These conferences
could provide a forum for short-courses on international law and its
proper use in U.S. courts.
The success of programmatic efforts in continuing judicial educa-
tion depends primarily on two things: first, on an institutionally-
based, organized effort to bring the program to the attention ofjudi-
cial educators, and second, on the ready availability of teaching mater-
277 For both theoretical and practical reasons, Professor Phillip R. Trimble has urged
those in charge of developing law school curricula to take better account of international
law not by requiring a separate course on the subject, but by integrating relevant aspects of
international law into current course offerings. Phillip R. Trimble, Affirmative Reply, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 408-09 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994).
278 No U.S. law school currently requires a course in international law. JOHN . GAM-
BLE, TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 1990s 22 (1993).
279 Id
280 Id. at 4 (citing CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, REPORT ON THE
TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
26 (1913)).
281 Recommendation & Report, supra note 5, at 1.
282 The American Bar Association's Section on International Law and Practice has
long recognized the need for judicial education in international law. See Committee Re-
port, supra note 10, at 903-04.
283 See generally National Conference of State Trial Judges & National Judicial College,
The Judge's Book 371-77 (2d ed. 1994) (surveying providers of continuing judicial
education).
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ials. Reformers should thus devote physical space, personnel and
funding to the effort and develop a model curriculum complete with
teaching materials. It would represent no small advance in these edu-
cational efforts simply to provide a primary text on international law
to every federal judge and to every state judge of general or appellate
jurisdiction.
The provision of books aside, the substance of the educational
effort would come in two parts. The first part would involve a study of
international law's sources, materials, and modes of argument, along
with some of its basic substantive principles. It would, in other words,
cover the kinds of topics typically surveyed in a law school course on
international law-geared, of course, toward those who are already
quite sophisticated in legal analysis. This would have an obvious and
direct effect on methodological provincialism. Armed with such
knowledge, judges simply could not ignore the differences between
international and domestic law.
The second part of the educational effort would involve a close
study of the relation between international and domestic law. It would
entail a longer and more sophisticated treatment of that subject than
is probably typical of most law school courses. The reason for this
emphasis is straightforward: judges must face the question of rele-
vance every time international law is argued, or whenever they believe,
based on their own research, that it might be pertinent. This part of
the educational program would likely begin with a brief treatment of
the philosophical and constitutional framework within which interna-
tional law operates domestically, followed by a critical examination of
the doctrines and practices discussed in this Article. It would examine
provincialism, element by element, asking in each case whether a con-
stitutional or congressional mandate requires the doctrine or practice,
and if not, whether the policies supporting the doctrine or practice
are sufficiently persuasive to overcome its harms. Such an examina-
tion would necessarily include the question of whether courts should
read supporting judicial precedents narrowly, confine those prece-
dents to their facts, or flatly overturn them as no longer good law.
The provincialism of U.S. courts does harm, sometimes serious
harm, to litigants, to the courts themselves, to the United States, to
international law, and to the rule of law. Such provincialism must be
challenged and U.S. judges must lead the effort. Judges are primarily
responsible for the treatment of international law in U.S. courts, and
judges are in the best position to implement reforms.
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